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Article 
Identifying Government Speech 
ANDY G. OLREE 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment to mean that when the government distributes money or other 
resources to private speakers, it generally may not discriminate among 
speakers based on viewpoint.  The government is, however, allowed to 
express its own viewpoint, even if it enlists the aid of private parties to get 
the message out, as long as the communication does not violate some 
separate legal restriction, such as the Establishment Clause.  Together, 
these understandings form the core of what has become known as the 
“government speech doctrine.”  This doctrine signals that distinguishing 
between government speech and private speech will become crucial in 
many cases involving either the Speech Clause or the Establishment 
Clause.  While the Court has announced the distinction in general terms 
and has decided cases based on it—including a notable case this term 
involving Ten Commandments monuments—the Court has yet to announce 
a standard by which judges can reliably identify government speech across 
a range of cases.  After examining several attempts by others to formulate 
such a standard, this Article suggests that the Court has now identified 
three basic types of government speech.  Accordingly, the Article proposes 
a three-factor test for identifying government speech, demonstrating how 
the test could function as a unifying explanation of precedent, and a 
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Identifying Government Speech 
ANDY G. OLREE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most familiar axioms in all of First Amendment law is the 
general rule that the government is not allowed to restrict private 
expression based on viewpoint.1  The axiom applies even when speakers 
use governmental resources to get their message out.  From time to time, 
the government actually facilitates expression by private persons—for 
example, by subsidizing a variety of speakers, by offering public land or 
other property as a forum for those who wish to speak, or by providing 
people some means of accessing a variety of private information sources 
and opinions.  In these and other similar contexts, government is not 
allowed to deny access to public property or support on the basis of the 
speaker’s viewpoint.2  The government may grant access to its aid 
selectively, but the access criteria must be viewpoint-neutral. 
However, government itself sometimes wishes to express its own 
particular viewpoint, and it is generally allowed to do so.  Governments 
often attempt to influence behavior and thought, not only by coercively 
penalizing certain behaviors or expressions, but by expressing viewpoints 
designed to affect the social milieu or to persuade people to think and act 
                                                                                                                          
* Professor of Law, Faulkner University, Thomas Goode Jones School of Law. 
1 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (“It is 
axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message 
it conveys.” (citing Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972))). 
2 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001) (finding that 
government cannot restrict speech on the basis of viewpoint and that any restriction must be 
reasonable); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541–42 (2001) (finding that a viewpoint-
based funding restriction was unconstitutional); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–31, 834 (“The 
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion 
or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392–94 (1993) (finding that the government may control access to 
a nonpublic forum “so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by 
the forum and are viewpoint neutral”); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870–71 (1982) (plurality 
opinion) (finding that the Board of Education has discretion in determining the content in school 
libraries, but the “discretion may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or political manner” such that 
certain ideas would be suppressed); see also United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 236 
(2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[I]n extreme cases [one could] expect particular [book acquisition] 
choices [by public libraries] to reveal impermissible reasons (reasons even the plurality would consider 
to be illegitimate), like excluding books because their authors are Democrats or their critiques of 
organized Christianity are unsympathetic.”); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 
587 (1998) (“[E]ven in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not ‘ai[m] at the suppression of 
dangerous ideas.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation of 
Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983))); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 
45–46 (1983) (noting that when governmental property functions as any kind of expression forum, 
whether public or nonpublic, the government may not “suppress expression [in the forum] merely 
because public officials oppose the speaker’s view”). 
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differently.3  Government then becomes one of a host of speakers 
competing in the marketplace of ideas.  Our notion of freedom of speech 
has not demanded that the government abstain from such a role, nor have 
we required government to endorse all viewpoints equally as it sends its 
messages.4  In other words, most citizens would likely agree with the 
courts that the government may send the message “Say no to drugs” 
without offending the First Amendment and without having to send the 
alternative message “Say yes to drugs.”5  Viewpoint neutrality is not 
usually required of the government when it is sending its own messages.6 
Hence, when courts examine viewpoint-based restrictions involving 
governmental property or resources, one distinction makes all the 
difference—if the speech is the government’s own speech, the viewpoint 
restrictions are permissible, but if the speech is private speech facilitated 
by government resources, viewpoint restrictions are generally 
impermissible.  Classifying the speech as either government speech or 
private speech becomes a crucial question—often the crucial question—in 
deciding these speech cases. 
When claims involve the Establishment Clause rather than the Speech 
Clause, identifying government speech is often just as crucial, although the 
effects of the identification are reversed.  In this sort of claim, someone has 
alleged that the government’s message constitutes governmental support 
of, or opposition to, religion, in violation of the Establishment Clause.  
Although private parties may send their own messages approving or 
disapproving of religion, the Supreme Court sometimes interprets the 
Establishment Clause to forbid the government from doing so.7  So if the 
                                                                                                                          
3 See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT 
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 5–10, 13–15 (1983) (discussing the “government’s increasing influence on 
and involvement in communications networks”); Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many 
Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1380–81, 1384–87 (2001) (identifying the 
capacities in which government speaks); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government 
Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 983–84, 986–87, 992 (2005) (arguing for greater transparency when 
government is promoting a particular message). 
4 See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553, 559–61 (2005) (holding that a federal 
program that finances advertising to promote an agricultural product is government speech); Velazquez, 
531 U.S. at 541 (“[V]iewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the 
government is itself the speaker . . . .”); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (“[W]hen the government 
appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.”); 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (noting that the government did not “discriminate[] on the 
basis of viewpoint when it [chose] to fund a program dedicated to advanc[ing] certain [] goals”). 
5 See DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 761 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“In 
sponsoring Nancy Reagan’s ‘Just Say No’ anti-drug campaign, the First Amendment did not require the 
government to sponsor simultaneously a ‘Just Say Yes’ campaign.”). 
6 Governmental messages regarding religion may be an exception to this rule, at least sometimes.  
See infra note 7 and accompanying text. 
7 See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“By showing a purpose 
to favor religion, the government ‘sends [an impermissible] message to . . . nonadherents’” (quoting 
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309–10 (2000))); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 
at 302 (“[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the 
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and 
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message constitutes government speech rather than private speech, the 
government may be violating the Establishment Clause. 
Identifying government speech becomes more difficult as governments 
become more and more involved in facilitating private speech, on the one 
hand, and in sending their own messages, on the other.  When a private 
speaker uses governmental property or support as she sends her message, 
who is really speaking?  How can we tell?  The higher the level of 
governmental support and involvement, the more the speech looks like the 
government’s own speech, particularly because governments now send so 
many messages of their own, and because this government may have made 
some affirmative decision to permit this particular speaker to use 
governmental resources, a decision similar in many respects to the decision 
to speak.  But private speech does not become government speech simply 
because the government allows the speaker to use governmental resources 
to get the message out.8  Judges must distinguish the government’s own 
messages from those of others, particularly in the contexts of Speech 
Clause claims, in which a finding of government speech is a point in the 
government’s favor, and Establishment Clause claims, in which a finding 
of government speech is a strike against the government. 
A uniform test for identifying government speech in these various 
contexts seems desirable, but lower courts are struggling mightily to come 
up with one.  A salient example is the set of cases dealing with specialty 
license plate programs,9 in which, for an additional fee, a state allows 
motorists obtaining license plates to choose from a menu of unique designs 
in lieu of the state’s standard plate design.10  Typically, private 
                                                                                                                          
Exercise Clauses protect.” (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990))); County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 600–01 (1989) (holding that the Establishment Clause prohibited a 
county’s display of a crèche because by permitting the display under the circumstances, “the county 
sends an unmistakable message that it supports and promotes the Christian praise to God that is the 
creche’s religious message”). 
8 See supra note 2 and accompanying text for examples of courts not allowing the government to 
deny access to public property or support on the basis of the speaker’s viewpoint. 
9 See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 862, 869–70 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that Missouri’s 
specialty license plate program violated the First Amendment); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 
853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that messages on specialty license plates do not constitute 
government speech); Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that messages conveyed through specialty license plates primarily represent private speech), cert. 
denied, 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008); ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376–77 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that specialty license plates represent government speech for the purposes of the Free Speech 
Clause); Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351, 352 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that the court did not have 
jurisdiction over a suit over a specialty license plate program that diverted excess charges to 
organizations endorsed by the legislature); Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 
(4th Cir. 2004) (holding that specialty license plates were neither purely government speech nor purely 
private speech); Women’s Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 943–45 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that individual residents did not have taxpayer standing to challenge Florida’s specialty license 
plate program under the Establishment Clause). 
10 For a discussion of various states’ specialty license plate programs, their general features, and 
some differences between them, see Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Free Speech and the Limits of Legislative 
Discretion: The Example of Specialty License Plates, 53 FLA. L. REV. 419, 424–41 (2001); Amy Riley 
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organizations must apply in advance to the state for permission to add their 
own design to the menu of options.  Many states have approved a lengthy 
menu of choices, but occasionally a state will deny a particular application 
because of the viewpoint represented by the applicant group or its 
proposed plate design.11  If the approved specialty plate designs are viewed 
as government speech, a viewpoint-based denial can be upheld as a 
governmental decision not to speak; but if the designs are viewed as 
private speech using government property, any viewpoint-based denial is 
presumptively unconstitutional, even though the plates are owned and 
issued by the government.  These cases have been giving federal courts fits 
over the past decade.  Two circuits have refused to decide such cases on 
the constitutional merits,12 but the circuits that have addressed the First 
Amendment arguments have employed widely varying analyses.  One 
circuit has viewed specialty plates as purely government speech;13 at least 
two have viewed the plates as private speech;14 one has viewed the plates 
                                                                                                                          
Lucas, Comment, Specialty License Plates: The First Amendment and the Intersection of Government 
Speech and Public Forum Doctrines, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1971, 2007–09, 2011–13, 2017 (2008). 
11 There is some dispute in some of these cases as to whether the state’s denial was driven by an 
intent to exclude a particular viewpoint or an entire subject matter.  If (as the Seventh Circuit has 
recently concluded with respect to Illinois’s specialty plate program) the state’s denial is truly the 
product of a reasonable desire to exclude from specialty plates all points of view related to a particular 
subject matter, the denial might be construed as viewpoint-neutral and is somewhat more defensible, 
even if the plates are not deemed to be government speech.  Compare Choose Life, 547 F.3d at 865–67 
(concluding that Illinois’s denial of an application for a “Choose Life” license plate was founded in a 
viewpoint-neutral state policy of refusing to issue plates for all groups expressing opinions on the 
subject matter of abortion), with Arizona Life Coal., 515 F.3d at 971–72 (concluding that Arizona’s 
denial of an application for a “Choose Life” license plate was founded in a state policy of refusing to 
issue plates for groups weighing in on the issue of abortion because it was so controversial, but that this 
fact demonstrated the state’s viewpoint discrimination, since the state’s statutes did not exclude 
controversial messages in general or the subject of abortion in particular, and the denial was based on 
the divisiveness of the proffered viewpoint).  This Article, however, focuses on situations in which 
viewpoint discrimination is present or assumed.  See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. 
Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 623–26 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding viewpoint 
discrimination where the state disapproved an organization’s proposed specialty plate design containing 
a Confederate flag because of the viewpoint represented by the flag).  In such cases, the crucial judicial 
task usually will be to distinguish government speech from private speech.  In other words, courts must 
determine whether the viewpoint discrimination represents the government’s attempt to control its own 
message or instead to disadvantage a disfavored private viewpoint. 
12 The Eleventh Circuit has dismissed a specialty plate complaint for lack of standing.  See 
Women’s Emergency Network, 323 F.3d at 940.  And the Fifth Circuit has held that the specialty plate 
fee is a tax and that therefore the federal Tax Injunction Act forbids federal court jurisdiction over 
specialty plate complaints.  See Henderson, 407 F.3d at 352. 
13 See Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 375–76 (Sixth Circuit) (holding that a “Choose Life” specialty 
license plate was government speech because the state had “final approval authority over every word 
used”). 
14 See Roach, 560 F.3d at 868 (Eighth Circuit) (finding that “under all the circumstances a 
reasonable and fully informed observer would recognize the message on the ‘Choose Life’ specialty 
plate as the message of a private party, not the state”); Arizona Life Coal., 515 F.3d at 968 (Ninth 
Circuit) (finding that specialty plates are private speech because the state did not “bear[] ultimate 
responsibility for the content of the speech”); see also Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 621–
22 (Fourth Circuit) (finding, in a case decided two years before Rose, that specialty plates constituted 
private speech); infra note 17 and accompanying text (noting that the Seventh Circuit has rejected the 
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as a hybrid of both governmental and private speech, requiring the court to 
impose a sort of intermediate scrutiny in evaluating viewpoint-based 
denials of specialty plate applications;15 and one, claiming that “private-
speech rights are implicated” by the plates and denying that the plates are 
government speech,16 has applied conventional forum analysis to the 
plates—as if they are private speech—without saying whether they 
constitute private speech or some form of hybrid speech.17  A clarification 
of the government speech doctrine would surely aid in the uniform 
resolution of such cases. 
On the Establishment Clause side, the identification of government 
speech can prove just as troublesome.  For example, the circuit courts have 
often been asked to identify government speech in cases involving 
inanimate displays in city parks.  One familiar bone of contention is the 
nativity scene or crèche erected on public property during the Christmas 
season.18  If a nativity scene is displayed on public property under 
circumstances suggesting that the government itself was “send[ing] an 
unmistakable message” endorsing Christianity, the display is forbidden by 
the Establishment Clause.19  But if such displays are donated or loaned to 
the government by private organizations, could they be viewed as private 
speech and thus immunized from Establishment Clause challenges?20 
Ten Commandments monuments, often donated to state or local 
government by a private religious or charitable group, represent another 
familiar type of inanimate display.  Some circuit courts have struck down 
such displays as violations of the Establishment Clause.21  The U.S. 
                                                                                                                          
contention that specialty plates were government speech and analyzed them using conventional forum 
analysis as if they constituted private speech, but refused to say whether they constituted private speech 
or hybrid speech). 
15 At least two of the judges on the Fourth Circuit’s three-judge panel in Rose reached this 
conclusion in separate opinions, although there was no opinion for the court.  See Planned Parenthood 
of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794–95 (4th Cir. 2004); id. at 800 (Luttig, J., concurring in 
judgment); see also id. at 801 (Gregory, J., concurring in judgment) (suggesting that specialty plate 
programs “have elements of both private and government speech”). 
16 Choose Life, 547 F.3d at 864 (Seventh Circuit). 
17 Id. at 864–67. 
18 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). 
19 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 600 (1989); cf. id. at 601 (“[B]y prohibiting 
government endorsement of religion, the Establishment Clause prohibits . . . the government’s lending 
its support to the communication of a religious organization’s religious message.”). 
20 One circuit has suggested that donated permanent displays in city parks constitute private 
speech in a public forum.  See Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 n.2, 1050–52 
(10th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132–34 (2009) (holding that the placement of a permanent 
monument in a public park is a form of government speech); Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 
1002, 1004–06 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that permanent monuments were a nonpublic forum because 
property was “not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication” (quotations omitted)). 
21 See, e.g., Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 481–82, 490 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
Commonwealth, by displaying a Ten Commandments monument, “emphasize[d] a single religious 
influence to the exclusion of all other religious and secular influences” in violation of the Establishment 
Clause); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 307–08 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a Ten 
Commandments monument on city property improperly advanced or endorsed religion in violation of 
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Supreme Court and some other circuits have held that governmental 
display of such monuments is sometimes permissible, but the opinions 
were not grounded in any assumption that the monuments constituted 
private speech rather than government speech.22  Yet the Tenth Circuit held 
in 2002 that donated monuments of this sort do constitute private speech.23  
Reasoning from that precedent, a competing religious group later 
convinced the circuit that a city displaying a donated Ten Commandments 
monument in the city’s park is operating a traditional public forum for 
private speech and must therefore also accept and display the group’s own 
unique donation to the city: a monument to the Seven Aphorisms of 
Summum.24  Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision, unanimously holding that donated Ten Commandments 
monuments constitute government speech.25  While clarifying the law with 
respect to certain monuments, however, the Court did not venture a method 
for identifying government speech in other circumstances.26 
Lower courts are increasingly required to identify government speech 
in a wide variety of free speech and religious establishment cases, and the 
circuits are reaching a wide variety of conclusions about how this ought to 
be done.  The confusion has led some commentators to suggest that the 
two-category approach itself is the problem.  Following the lead of the 
Fourth Circuit in its most recent specialty plates case, commentators are 
increasingly calling for an end to the rigidly binary government 
speech/private speech distinction, claiming that much speech falls 
somewhere in between and arguing for the creation of a third category of 
                                                                                                                          
the Establishment Clause); see also Staley v. Harris County, 461 F.3d 504, 514–15 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that a county monument commemorating a local citizen and located on courthouse grounds 
violated the Establishment Clause because it contained an open Bible and had been recently refurbished 
for the purpose of calling attention to the Bible), vacated en banc as moot and unripe, 485 F.3d 305 
(5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 647 (2007); Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that the Establishment Clause was violated when the chief justice of the state 
supreme court erected a Ten Commandments monument, built with private funds, in a state judicial 
building). 
22 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005) (ruling that the display of a Ten 
Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol did not violate the Establishment 
Clause); Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a city’s display 
of a Ten Commandments monument was permissible because, inter alia, “nothing apart from the 
monument’s text suggests a religious motive on the City’s part”); ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of 
Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 776–78 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the city’s display of a Ten 
Commandments monument did not violate the Establishment Clause because the monument made 
passive use of the Commandments “to acknowledge the role of religion in our Nation’s heritage”). 
23 City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1004–06. 
24 Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d at 1047, 1050–55. 
25 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009); id. at 1141 (Souter, J., 
concurring in judgment).  See infra notes 299–306 and accompanying text for further discussion of 
Pleasant Grove and the Supreme Court’s holding that the government speaks when it accepts, 
embraces, and communicates a donated message. 
26 See Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1132 (“There may be situations in which it is difficult to 
tell whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing a forum for private 
speech, but this case does not present such a situation.”). 
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“hybrid” or “mixed” speech, restrictions on which would qualify for some 
medium degree of scrutiny or an ad hoc balancing of the competing 
interests involved.27 
The hybrid approach is alluring, but in this Article, I will  argue that it 
leads to inconsistent results and that it may insufficiently protect free 
speech rights; furthermore, I will argue, the hybrid approach is in tension 
with the whole notion of government speech as developed by the Supreme 
Court.  I will also argue that, while the traditional binary approach is 
preferable, the tests developed by some circuits to categorize speech within 
that binary framework are flawed and likewise misstate the law.  I believe 
Supreme Court precedents can be distilled into the notion that government 
speech arises in one of three basic ways.  I will propose this three-factor 
test as a preferable method of consistently identifying government speech 
in both expression cases and establishment cases.  I do not argue that the 
Court has formally or intentionally embraced this test—only that the test 
provides a useful way of understanding what the Court has done and 
predicting what it will do.  My purpose is thus to explain the results in a 
variety of the Court’s speech and establishment cases, and also, 
secondarily, to provide a few reasons why the Court’s approach, 
understood in this way, might be preferable to alternatives.28 
Part II briefly describes the development of the government speech 
doctrine by the Supreme Court.  Part III discusses one approach used by 
the Sixth Circuit to identify government speech, an approach that in effect 
considers a single factor to be determinative.  Part IV analyzes a four-
pronged test for identifying government speech which has been more 
commonly used by various circuits.  Part V discusses the proposal by a few 
judges and recent commentators that courts should recognize a third 
“hybrid” or “mixed” category of speech.  Part VI suggests an alternative 
approach which I believe explains and reconciles the key Supreme Court 
precedents while also providing a more complete and consistent protection 
of private speech.  Finally, Part VII suggests ways in which this approach 
might be used in understanding Supreme Court precedents and resolving 
some current legal controversies in both free speech and establishment 
contexts. 
                                                                                                                          
27 For the most extended recent discussion, see Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When 
Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 675–77 (2008).  Other recent 
commentators have also suggested or assumed this approach, albeit without extended consideration of 
alternatives.  See, e.g., Lucas, supra note 10, at 2013, 2022; Helen Norton, The Measure of Government 
Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 620–21 (2008). 
28 My primary purpose is descriptive.  While I do provide a very limited defense of the Court’s 
approach—partly in the form of a critique of existing alternatives—a fuller normative evaluation must 
await another article.  I likewise save for another day the development of a unifying theory that might 
explain why the Court sees government speech in each of these three particular situations and not 
others. 
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II.  THE ORIGINS OF THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE 
According to accepted wisdom, the government speech doctrine, as 
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, had its genesis in Rust v. Sullivan.29  
In Rust, federal law prohibited the distribution of certain federal “family 
planning project[]” funds to entities that provided abortion counseling or 
referrals, or which otherwise encouraged abortion.30  The Court rejected 
the claim that the government had selectively withheld funds from a 
handful of private speakers due to its disfavor of their viewpoint; instead, 
the Court upheld the program as a permissible decision by the federal 
government about how it would design its own programs and spend its 
own money.31  “‘[A] legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of 
a fundamental right,’” said the Court, “‘does not infringe the right.’”32  The 
Court saw the funding limitation as a decision about how to use limited 
subsidy resources—not as discrimination against a disfavored viewpoint, 
but as the inevitable result of defining the scope and limits of a 
governmental spending program.33 
The Court itself seems to have accepted the common view that the 
government speech doctrine originated in its opinion in Rust.  Ten years 
after Rust, the Court described the case’s implications as follows: 
The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the 
rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors . . .  
amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the 
holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust on 
this understanding.  We have said that viewpoint-based 
funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the 
government is itself the speaker . . . or instances, like Rust, in 
which the government “used private speakers to transmit 
specific information pertaining to its own program.”34 
Lower courts have widely adopted this understanding of Rust as a 
leading case on the government speech doctrine—or at least have noted 
that the Court has done so.35 
According to this accepted wisdom, the government prevailed in Rust 
because the funded speech at issue, although conveyed by private parties, 
                                                                                                                          
29 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
30 Id. at 178–80. 
31 Id. at 193–94. 
32 Id. at 193 (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983)). 
33 Id. at 194–95. 
34 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)). 
35 E.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 
F.3d 610, 617–18 (4th Cir. 2002); Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 
2001); see also ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 378 (6th Cir. 2006) (referring to the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Rust as authority when deciding a government speech doctrine case). 
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was government speech rather than private speech.  The funding rules were 
part of a larger governmental program to encourage or discourage some 
private activity—in Rust, a program to discourage abortion and to 
encourage family planning using alternative methods.  The funds were 
allocated so as to ensure that private speakers would “transmit specific 
information”—the government’s message—in support of the governmental 
program.36  The “family planning without abortion” message was the 
government’s own message, crafted in advance by the government, and the 
funds at issue were part of a program designed to promote that kind of 
family planning rather than speech in general;37 therefore, the government 
was not required to fund messages by private speakers expressing other 
viewpoints, conveying other information, or offering other services.  The 
viewpoint restriction could stand. 
The government speech doctrine clearly continues in full strength.  In a 
pair of subsequent cases alleging compelled speech by means of a forced 
subsidy,38 the Court signaled that the presence of government speech 
would be determinative.39  These cases involved the claim that the 
government had compelled the claimants to pay fees or taxes which were 
used in part to fund messages with which the claimants disagreed. 
In one of the cases, public university students were forced to pay a 
student activity fee, a portion of which was later distributed to student 
groups conveying messages that certain students found objectionable.40  
The objecting students claimed they were being compelled to speak, in 
violation of their First Amendment rights.41  Although the messages were 
deemed private speech, the Court upheld the program to the extent that the 
government’s criteria for distribution were viewpoint-neutral;42 the Court 
noted in dicta, however, that if the objectionable messages had constituted 
government speech, viewpoint neutrality in the distribution might not be 
required because the government is allowed to tax even dissenting parties 
to pay for its own speech.43 
In the other case, decided only four years ago, the Court turned this 
dictum into law, upholding the disputed tax precisely because the Court 
                                                                                                                          
36 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. 
37 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 178–79 (stating that Congress passed Title X to ensure that funds would 
only be used for preventive family planning and not for abortion). 
38 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 555–56 (2005); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 
Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000). 
39 A line of compelled speech precedents holds that the First Amendment Speech Clause forbids 
the government under some circumstances to force private parties to pay a subsidy to support the 
speech of other private parties with whom the payer disagrees.  E.g., United States v. United Foods, 
Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. 
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233–35 (1977). 
40 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 222–27. 
41 Id. at 226–27. 
42 Id. at 233–34. 
43 Id. at 229. 
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found the funded messages, conveyed by private parties, to be government 
speech.44  The federal government had taxed sales and imports of cattle to 
fund “beef-related projects” such as “promotion and research.”45  A 
substantial amount of the money was used to fund beef advertising, 
including ads containing the familiar slogan “Beef.  It’s What’s for 
Dinner.”46  Some beef producers did not like the ads and complained that 
the tax effectively compelled them to speak against their will, in violation 
of the First Amendment.47  The Court upheld the tax, however, on the 
ground that the ads at issue constituted government speech.48  The Court 
was able to reach this conclusion because: 
The message set out in the beef promotions is from 
beginning to end the message established by the Federal 
Government. . . . Congress and the Secretary [of Agriculture] 
have set out the overarching message and some of its 
elements, and they have left the development of the 
remaining details to an entity whose members are answerable 
to the Secretary . . . .  
Moreover . . . the Secretary exercises final approval 
authority over every word used in every promotional 
campaign.49 
Importantly, the Court said that the finding of government speech would be 
the same even if a reasonable viewer would not attribute the message to the 
government.50 
Meanwhile, in other cases where the government used viewpoint as a 
criterion for allocating funds, the Court struck down the funding program 
when it found that the funded messages constituted private speech rather 
than government speech.  In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of 
University of Virginia,51 a public university required the payment of a 
student activity fee which was collected in a fund and distributed to student 
groups conveying various messages.52  The Court struck down the program 
upon finding that the government’s criteria for distributing the funds were 
not viewpoint-neutral and that the messages themselves constituted private 
speech.53  The Court distinguished Rust—which had also involved criteria 
that were not viewpoint-neutral—by noting that in Rust, the funded 
                                                                                                                          
44 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553, 560–64 (2005). 
45 Id. at 554. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 555–56. 
48 Id. at 553, 560–64. 
49 Id. at 560–61. 
50 Id. at 564 n.7. 
51 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
52 Id. at 823–25. 
53 Id. at 833–35. 
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messages constituted government speech because “the government did not 
create a program to encourage private speech but instead used private 
speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own program.”54 
A few years later the Court extended this reasoning in a case involving 
federal funding for legal services.55  Federal laws authorized funding for 
private organizations providing free legal assistance to indigent clients in 
certain kinds of cases, but denied such funding if the organization made 
“an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare law.”56  The 
Court struck down the funding limitation, finding that this restriction 
operated as a denial of funding based on the expressed viewpoint of would-
be recipients.57  The government argued that its funding program was a 
program of government speech indistinguishable from the one upheld in 
Rust, but the Court found that the program had more in common with the 
funding program struck down in Rosenberger: 
[T]he salient point is that, like the program in Rosenberger, 
[this] program was designed to facilitate private speech, not 
to promote a governmental message. . . . The advice from the 
attorney to the client and the advocacy by the attorney to the 
courts cannot be classified as governmental speech even 
under a generous understanding of the concept.58 
The Court refused to find that the legal services funding program had 
created any kind of forum for private expression,59 but this did not change 
the outcome.  The funding restriction was not a governmental decision 
about what message it wanted to pay others to send on its behalf, but rather 
a decision to suppress a disfavored message originating with private 
speakers: 
[I]n the context of this statute there is no programmatic 
message of the kind recognized in Rust and which sufficed 
there to allow the Government to specify the advice deemed 
necessary for its legitimate objectives.  This serves to 
distinguish [the statute here] from any of the Title X program 
restrictions upheld in Rust . . . .60 
Thus, the Court in this line of Speech Clause cases has provided some 
                                                                                                                          
54 Id. at 833. 
55 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547–48 (2001). 
56 Id. at 536–37. 
57 Id. at 547–49. 
58 Id. at 542–43. 
59 See id. at 544 (“As this suit involves a subsidy, limited forum cases . . . may not be controlling 
in a strict sense . . . .”); id. at 542 (“[T]he LSC program differs from the program at issue in 
Rosenberger in that its purpose is not to ‘encourage a diversity of views’ . . . .” (quoting Rosenberger, 
515 U.S. at 834)). 
60 Id. at 548. 
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guidance about how to identify government speech.  But the guidance has 
not often been explicitly applied in other contexts, such as Establishment 
Clause claims, in which the Court needed to distinguish between 
government speech and private speech.  When members of the local clergy 
deliver prayers at public school graduation exercises,61 when a private 
nonprofit group donates a Ten Commandments monument to a state which 
then displays the monument on the grounds of the state capitol,62 when a 
student delivers prayers over a loudspeaker to begin each home game of a 
public high school’s football season63—in these and other scenarios 
evoking Establishment Clause claims, the Court has been called to decide 
whether a particular religious message is government speech or private 
speech.  For the most part, the Court has not set forth unique rules for 
identifying government speech in all Establishment Clause cases, nor has it 
often referenced the government speech doctrine emanating from Rust and 
the other Speech Clause cases.  Instead, the approach has been less unified 
and intentional.  The Court has addressed the issue using fluctuating 
descriptors as it evaluated the unique circumstances of each case: from 
time to time the Court has expressed concern over the “degree of school 
[or governmental] involvement” in the message,64 the degree of 
governmental “endorsement” of the message,65 the degree of governmental 
“entanglement” in the message,66 the degree to which the government is 
“lending its support to the communication of a religious organization’s 
religious message,”67 and/or the degree to which a “reasonable observer” 
would attribute the message to the government.68 
                                                                                                                          
61 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992). 
62 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682 (2005). 
63 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000). 
64 Id. at 305 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 590). 
65 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 305, 307–08, 315–16 (analyzing the specific facts of the case and 
holding that the school district’s policy involves both perceived and actual endorsement of student 
prayer); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592–94 (1989) (citing cases involving 
governmental “endorsement” of religion and how the Establishment Clause prohibits government from 
appearing to take a position on religious issues). 
66 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 305–06 (noting that petitioner school district “attempted to 
disentangle itself from the religious messages by developing the two-step student election process”); 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–34 (1997) (examining whether New York City’s Title I program 
resulted in an excessive entanglement between church and state). 
67 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601. 
68 See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005) (quoting Capitol Square 
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment); Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 315 (noting that “reasonable observers have reasonable 
memories” which will cause observers to note the context in which the policy arose); id. at 308 (finding 
that a pregame prayer would “unquestionably” be perceived as “stamped with [the] school’s seal of 
approval”); see also County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593–94 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The 
Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on 
questions of religious belief . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 
(1983))).  But see Pinette, 515 U.S. at 765–68 (rejecting the contention that the Establishment Clause is 
violated whenever a reasonable observer might mistake private religious speech for the government’s 
own speech). 
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Nevertheless, in freedom of speech cases, lower courts have accepted 
the Rust-inspired government speech doctrine and seem to be aware that 
when the government has a message to send, such a message need not be 
viewpoint-neutral, and other messages need not receive governmental 
support.  The difficulty has come in recognizing when the message is the 
government’s message.  Accepting (and sometimes expanding) the limited 
guidance of the Supreme Court regarding the government speech doctrine, 
lower courts and commentators have advocated varying approaches for 
identifying government speech. 
Some of these approaches, which this Article labels “binary 
approaches,” more closely track the teaching of the Supreme Court’s 
Speech Clause cases by assuming that any particular message must be 
either government speech or private speech; they then proceed to classify it 
as one or the other.  Other approaches, however, find this binary 
classification system unnecessarily restrictive and unrealistic; they allow 
for a third category of “hybrid” or “mixed” speech—unrecognized thus far 
by the Supreme Court—which carries its own unique implications for 
judging the powers and duties of government.  The binary approaches, in 
turn, differ from one another on the question of which factors to consider 
in classifying a message as governmental speech. 
III.  THE BINARY APPROACH USING A SINGLE-FACTOR TEST 
Like most federal appellate courts that have addressed the issue, the 
Sixth Circuit has adopted a binary approach to classifying speech: a 
message may constitute either government speech or private speech, but 
not both.69  In one recent case, however, the Sixth Circuit parted ways with 
most of these other courts when it held that a message constitutes 
government speech whenever “the government determines an overarching 
message and retains power to approve every word disseminated at its 
behest.”70  While this standard might at first appear to encompass two 
distinct factors—whether “the government determines an overarching 
message” and whether the government “retains power to approve every 
word disseminated at its behest”71—the Sixth Circuit largely ignored the 
first of those factors, effectively reducing the test for government speech to 
                                                                                                                          
69 When invited to recognize a third category of “mixed speech” in a specialty license plate case, 
as the Fourth Circuit had previously done, the Sixth Circuit refused to do so.  See ACLU of Tenn. v. 
Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 376, 380 (6th Cir. 2006). 
70 Id. at 375 (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559–67 (2005)).  It is 
currently somewhat unclear whether the Sixth Circuit views this test as controlling in every case.  See 
Grosjean v. Bommarito, 302 F. App’x 430, 436 (6th Cir. 2008) (favorably citing Bredesen’s test, but 
noting that “the two factors identified in [the Supreme Court case upon which Bredesen relied] were 
not . . . held to be exhaustive,” and suggesting in dicta that another relevant factor might be “whether 
the speech is attributed to a particular private actor”). 
71 Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 375 (citing Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559–67).  
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a question of how much power the government had to approve or veto the 
wording and design of the message before it was disseminated. 
The case before the court, ACLU of Tennessee v. Bredesen,72 involved 
specialty license plates.73  The state of Tennessee had authorized its 
Department of Safety to issue specialty plates to motorists willing to pay a 
surcharge, and the menu of available plates was continually expanding; the 
general rules were that the Department could make a new specialty plate 
available whenever (1) the legislature authorized the particular plate by 
name;74 (2) the state commissioner of revenue approved a design for that 
plate submitted by a private sponsor;75 and (3) the state received at least 
one thousand advance orders for that plate.76  In routine practice, 
apparently, when a private organization desired a specialty plate of its own, 
the organization lobbied the state legislature to introduce and pass a bill 
authorizing the plate.77  By the time of the litigation, the state legislature 
had authorized over one hundred different specialty plates, including a 
“Choose Life” plate,78 but had rejected a bill, for which Planned 
Parenthood lobbied, that would have authorized a “Pro-Choice” plate.79 
Recognizing that the key question in the case was whether the “Choose 
Life” message constituted government speech, the Sixth Circuit held that 
the recent Supreme Court opinion in Johanns80 had established a new 
standard for identifying government speech, and that this standard was 
controlling.  “Johanns stands for the proposition,” said the court, “that 
when the government determines an overarching message and retains 
power to approve every word disseminated at its behest, the message must 
                                                                                                                          
72 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006). 
73 For a brief description of specialty license plates and the legal issues involved, see supra notes 
9–17 and accompanying text. 
74 In general, each plate was required to be explicitly listed in a state statute, which of course 
required that the legislature approve each particular plate; however, the legislature was only approving 
them in concept (such as “Choose Life plates,” “NASCAR plates,” “Mothers Against 
Methamphetamine (MAMA) plates,” etc.), usually leaving the particular design to be worked out 
between the private sponsoring organization and the state commissioner of revenue, who was granted 
veto power over the design.  See TENN. CODE. ANN. § 55-4-201 (2009) (outlining requirements of 
cultural, specialty earmarked, and new specialty earmarked license plates); id. § 55-4-202 (providing 
examples of specialty earmarked license plates); id. § 55-4-210 (“The department is authorized to 
administratively issue personalized plates to qualified applicants.”); id. §§ 55-4-305 to 307 (providing 
legislative authority for “Choose Life plates,” “NASCAR plates,” and “Mothers Against 
Menthamphetamine (MAMA) plates”); Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 372 (noting that Tennessee law allows 
special logotypes on license plates and that the Tennessee legislature authorized the “Choose Life” 
logotype); Bredesen, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (discussing Tennessee law to issue specialty plates). 
75 TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-201(b)(4) (2009); Bredesen, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 772. 
76 TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-201(h)(1) (2009); Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 372. 
77 See Bredesen, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 773 n.4 (“[P]articipants in the license plate scheme . . . . must 
find legislators willing to sponsor a bill.” (quoting Henderson v. Stalder, 265 F. Supp. 2d 699, 717 
(E.D. La. 2003))); Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 372 (noting that Planned Parenthood unsuccessfully “lobbied 
for an amendment authorizing a ‘Pro-Choice’ specialty license plate”). 
78 Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 372, 376. 
79 Id. at 372; Bredesen, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 772. 
80 See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text. 
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be attributed to the government for First Amendment purposes.”81  After a 
rather conclusory observation that Tennessee had chosen an “overarching 
message” in this case because the legislature “spelled out in the statute that 
these plates would bear the words ‘Choose Life,’”82 the court spent most of 
its time on the latter portion of the Johanns formulation, arguing that the 
commissioner’s veto power over plate design meant that the state 
“retain[ed] power to approve every word disseminated at its behest.”83  
While admitting that motorists’ “voluntary dissemination [of the ‘Choose 
Life’ message] itself qualifies as expressive conduct,”84 the court found 
that the plates themselves contained only government speech and did not 
constitute any sort of government-created forum for private speech.85  The 
court offered the following support for this finding: (1) the Supreme Court 
once characterized the New Hampshire state motto “‘Live Free or Die’ as 
‘the State’s ideological message’” when that motto was embossed on all 
New Hampshire license plates;86 (2) Johanns and Rust show that the 
government does not necessarily create a speech forum every time it uses 
private volunteers (or hired hands) to disseminate a governmental 
message;87 and (3) finding a forum in cases like this would “render 
unconstitutional a large swath of government actions that nearly everyone 
would consider desirable and legitimate,” such as government-produced 
“Register and Vote” pins worn by private citizens, or postage stamps that 
say “Win the War.”88 
The court’s reasons for refusing to find a forum seem weak.  In Wooley 
v. Maynard,89 the New Hampshire “Live Free or Die” case, “Live Free or 
Die” was the state motto, and it was embossed on all standard-issue plates.  
No motorists paid extra for them or selected that message over others; in 
fact, the state required all noncommercial vehicles to bear that message on 
their license plates.90  This message was not one of over one hundred state-
allowed options for motorists, as in Bredesen;91 rather, it was not optional 
at all.  Under such circumstances, it is easy to conclude that the message 
“Live Free or Die,” which was, after all, the state motto, was government 
speech rather than private speech, and that no speech forum had been 
                                                                                                                          
81 Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 375 (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559–67 
(2005)). 
82 Id. at 376. 
83 Id. at 375. 
84 Id. at 377. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 377–78 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977)); see Wooley, 430 U.S. at 
717 (holding that New Hampshire could not constitutionally prosecute car owners for obscuring the 
motto “Live Free or Die” on their license plates). 
87 Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 378. 
88 Id. at 378–79. 
89 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
90 Id. at 707. 
91 See Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 376. 
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created simply by embossing all standard-issue license plates with this 
message.  But that says very little about whether a message represented in 
one design appearing on a long menu of various specialty plate designs—a 
message that will never be communicated at all unless a motorist chooses 
to pay for it—constitutes private speech, or whether such a specialty plate 
program creates a forum of some kind for private speakers.  Wooley is 
simply inapposite.  Moreover, while Johanns and Rust may indeed suggest 
that the government can use private parties—even volunteers—to 
disseminate a message without creating a forum, Johanns and Rust do not 
show that the government’s use of private volunteers precludes a finding 
that the government program is a forum—only that the use of volunteers 
by itself does not make it so.  In other words, and perhaps unsurprisingly, 
the volunteer element is not alone determinative of whether a forum has 
been created, although every forum will include volunteers conveying 
messages.  But of course, there are several other elements common to 
specialty plate programs, elements not present in the governmental 
programs at issue in Johanns, Rust, or Wooley, which might indicate the 
presence of a speech forum.92 
These considerations suggest serious logical flaws in each of the 
court’s first two reasons for refusing to find a forum.  One suspects, then, 
that the driving force behind the Sixth Circuit’s rejection of forum analysis 
may have been its third reason: the fear of a slippery slope.  This fear 
alone, however, is a rather unsatisfying basis for denying that the 
government had established a forum.  Moreover, the court’s concerns seem 
overblown, since government pins, stamps, and the like do not present 
many indicators of a speech forum and could be readily distinguished from 
specialty plates on that basis.93 
Of course, the Sixth Circuit had to dispose of the forum argument in 
order to stand by its prior conclusion that the message “Choose Life” 
constituted purely government speech.94  In reaching that prior conclusion, 
the court assumed Johanns had changed the law, or at least clarified it, 
                                                                                                                          
92 These elements might include, inter alia, the fact that the government widely invites (explicitly 
or implicitly) private parties endorsing various unknown messages to apply for governmental 
permission to use governmental property in sending those messages, the fact that the government does 
not tax anyone or spend its own money to promote any particular message, the fact that the impulse to 
communicate each message originates outside the halls of government, and the fact that the messages 
actually sent under the program are numerous, varied, and sometimes (at least somewhat) 
contradictory.  Id. at 381–85 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reasoning that the 
program allows for a variety of views and is designed to promote private speech rather than to convey a 
government message). 
93 For example, it seems likely that messages appearing on government pins and stamps—
messages such as “Win the War” and “Register and Vote”—originated with the government, not 
private applicants.  One also suspects that it was not the government’s historic practice to allow dozens 
(or hundreds) of private organizations to emblazon their own unique advertising on the government’s 
pins and stamps. 
94 See supra notes 80–88 and accompanying text. 
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with respect to all sorts of speech.95  As understood by the Sixth Circuit, 
the Johanns test for government speech, regardless of the content or 
context of the message, required a simple determination of whether the 
government had (1) “determine[d] an overarching message” and (2) 
“retain[ed] power to approve every word disseminated at its behest.”96  But 
the Sixth Circuit never seriously applied the first prong.  The court found, 
without further elaboration, that the first prong was satisfied because 
“Tennessee set the overall message and the specific message when it 
spelled out in the statute that these plates would bear the words ‘Choose 
Life.’”97  Aside from the paucity of the court’s discussion, there are at least 
two problems with this analysis under the first prong, suggesting that the 
first prong was effectively meaningless as applied. 
First, the court inexplicably refused to consider the purpose or message 
of the specialty plate program as a whole; instead, it considered only the 
message reflected in the short statutory provision authorizing “Choose 
Life” plates.98  The “Choose Life” message, reflected in this single statute, 
was only one of many messages disseminated by the state’s specialty plate 
program.99  In Johanns, the Supreme Court found that the government had 
“determine[d] an overarching message”100 only after the Court had 
considered the program of which the message was a part—and there was 
no indication in those cases that the larger government program involved 
numerous messages on varied topics.  In Rust, the relevant program was 
considered to be “the Title X program,” which was designed “to encourage 
family planning” without encouraging abortions;101 the Title X program 
funded services and messages consistent with this unitary purpose.102  In 
Johanns, the relevant program was a tax-and-spend scheme designed to 
“promot[e] the marketing and consumption of ‘beef and beef products,’”103 
and some program funds were spent on sending messages consistent with 
                                                                                                                          
95 See Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 380 (rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s approach to specialty plates 
because, inter alia, “the Fourth Circuit opinions . . . are in tension with the intervening case of Johanns.  
Johanns sets forth an authoritative test for determining when speech may be attributed to the 
government for First Amendment purposes.  [The Fourth Circuit] relied instead on a pre-Johanns four-
factor test . . . .”). 
96 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
97 Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 376. 
98 See id. at 375–77 (analyzing the questions about government speech and the existence of a 
forum by reference only to the portion of the Tennessee Code authorizing “Choose Life” license plates, 
not other statutes authorizing other specialty license plates). 
99 See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text (discussing the numerous types of specialty 
plates and how the number of specialty plates was continually expanding). 
100 See Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 375 (discussing the Supreme Court’s holding in Johanns). 
101 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991). 
102 Id. at 179–80, 192–93. 
103 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (quoting The Beef Promotion and 
Research Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99–198, § 2, 99 Stat. 1597, 1598 (1985) (codified as amended at 7 
U.S.C. § 2901(b))). 
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this purpose.104  In Bredesen, however, the “Choose Life” message was not 
sent as part of some state program designed to encourage adoptions or 
discourage abortions; rather, it was sent as part of a specialty license plate 
program—and over one hundred different messages, on various topics, 
were sent under the auspices of that program.105  Yet the Sixth Circuit 
refused to take account of that program in deciding whether the 
government had crafted an “overarching message,” or in defining the 
message itself.106  Judging the government’s purpose or message by 
reference to the “Choose Life” statute, in isolation, ignores the 
governmental program of which that message was a part: it ignores the 
governmental actions and operational context which made such statutes 
and messages possible. 
Second, in finding that the government had “determine[d] an 
overarching message” by authorizing “Choose Life” plates, the Sixth 
Circuit ignored the true origins of the message, instead resting its finding 
of governmental “determin[ation]” on the mere evidence that the state 
legislature had passed a statute approving dissemination of a message by 
private parties willing to pay.107  This obscures the reality that the message 
“Choose Life” originated, not with the state legislature, but with one or 
more private sector organizations that lobbied for this particular message 
and stood to benefit directly from its dissemination.108  This certainly was 
not the case in Rust.  And in Johanns, while some associations of beef 
producers may have lobbied for the establishment of a pro-beef program in 
general terms, the messages themselves were crafted only after the 
government had established the program, and those producers’ ties to those 
messages were quite indirect.109  Unlike the federal government in Rust and 
                                                                                                                          
104 Id. at 553–55. 
105 See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text (explicating the conditions under which 
Tennessee could authorize a new specialty plate). 
106 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
107 ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375 (6th Cir. 2006). 
108 In Tennessee, the “principal direct financial beneficiary of the ‘Choose Life’ license plate 
plan” was a nonprofit organization called New Life Resources, Inc., which filed a successful motion to 
intervene in the Bredesen case.  ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 354 F. Supp. 2d 770, 772 (M.D. Tenn. 
2004).  As of late 2009, twenty-one states offered “Choose Life” specialty plates, and  all but one of 
these states directed funds from the specialty plate purchase to private organizations; in the remaining 
state, purchasers of the “Choose Life” plate were allowed an opportunity to contribute to such 
organizations at the time of purchase.  Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief: “Choose Life” 
License Plates (Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ 
CLLP.pdf; see also Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 
288 F.3d 610, 614 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding that, in a Virginia specialty plate program in which “plates 
must be specifically authorized by statute,” the ordinary practice was that “a group or organization that 
would like to have a special license plate made available to its members contacts a member of the 
General Assembly to request that a bill be introduced which, if enacted, would authorize the issuance 
of a special plate”). 
109 Most importantly, producers did not receive a monetary payment every time the ads ran, or 
every time a consumer chose to display the message “Beef.  It’s What’s for Dinner.”  Moreover, only a 
select few producers—some of whom were chosen by the government—participated in designing the 
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in Johanns, the Tennessee government “determine[d] an overarching 
message” of “Choose Life” (among many others) only after that exact 
message had already been “determine[d]” and proposed to the government 
by one or more private organizations, who hoped to gain the government’s 
approval of their fundraising plan.110  Thus, Tennessee’s involvement 
could reasonably be characterized as the mere perfunctory approval of a 
message presented to the state from the private sector.  Arguably, this is 
not what the Supreme Court had in mind in Johanns when it characterized 
government speech by noting that “from beginning to end [it is] the 
message established by the Federal Government.”111 
These problems with the Sixth Circuit’s approach suggest that the 
court largely ignored the governmental determination of the message, and 
allowed the second prong of its Johanns formulation, regarding 
governmental veto power over the final wording, to dictate the 
classification of this speech as government speech.  Thus, the Sixth 
Circuit’s method of identifying government speech in Bredesen represents 
a binary approach, using what is in essence a single-factor test.  The court 
determined that there were two possibilities here—the message was either 
government speech, or private speech—and then the court considered only 
one factor in making the classification: did the government retain power to 
approve the final wording of the message? 
Indeed, this determinative prong—whether the government “retain[ed] 
power to approve every word disseminated at its behest”—did, in isolation, 
point in the direction of government speech.  Like the federal government 
in Johanns, the Tennessee government (or its agents) held veto power to 
approve or disapprove the final wording and design of the “Choose Life” 
message in advance of dissemination.112  And this factor, in those cases 
where it is combined with the sort of pervasive governmental involvement 
present in Johanns,113 makes the message look like government speech.  
Without that pervasive governmental involvement, however—involvement 
which was not present in Bredesen—governmental veto power over the 
final wording of a message could simply be evidence of prior restraint or 
                                                                                                                          
message; indeed, some producers and producer associations did not like the ads.  Johanns v. Livestock 
Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553–56 (2005).  And while many of the ads did say “Funded by America’s 
Beef Producers,” no preexisting private entity was explicitly named in the ads, as they are on many 
specialty plates.  Id. at 555.  See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-4-307 (2008) (Mothers Against 
Methamphetamine plates); id. § 55-4-311 (Tennessee Performing Arts Center plates). 
110 ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375 (6th Cir. 2006); see supra 74–79 and 
accompanying text (noting that by the time of the litigation, the legislature already authorized over 100 
specialty plates, one of which was “Choose Life”). 
111 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61. 
112 See ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 354 F. Supp. 2d 770, 772 (M.D. Tenn. 2004) (“The plate is 
effectively designed by its private sponsor, New Life Resources, Inc., and approved by the State.”). 
113 See supra notes 44–50, 103–104, 109, and accompanying text (detailing the extent to which 
the government was involved in the messaging of the program). 
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censorship in violation of the Speech Clause.114 
This is the central problem with identifying government speech solely 
by reference to whether the government exercised veto power over the 
message.  In contexts where the government did not come up with the idea 
of reaching an audience with this particular message, and instead merely 
came up with the idea of granting licenses for the private originators of 
approved messages to express those messages on government property, 
any such “approved” message looks most unlike the government speech 
present in Rust and Johanns.  In fact, the message looks like private 
speech, and the licensing scheme like a government-created forum for 
speech.  Under such circumstances, the additional fact that the government 
held veto power over the message’s final wording seems to indicate 
censorship of private speech, not editorial control of the government’s own 
speech.  Surely, evidence that the government exercised editorial control 
over a private speaker’s message in advance of dissemination should not, 
by itself, convert otherwise private speech into government speech and 
convince judges that a forum never existed.  This is especially easy to see 
if we imagine the Sixth Circuit applying its approach in other speech 
contexts, such as speech in city parks or other traditional public forums. 
IV.  THE BINARY APPROACH USING THE FOUR-PRONGED TEST 
Like the Sixth Circuit, most of the other circuits addressing 
government speech issues have used a binary approach—that is, they have 
assumed that any given message must be either government speech or 
private speech—but they do not adopt the Sixth Circuit’s single-pronged 
classification test that prioritizes government approval of the final wording.  
Instead, most of them have identified government speech by using some 
version of a four-pronged test, originally enunciated as such by the Tenth 
Circuit.115 
A.  The Tenth Circuit Formulates the Four-Pronged Test 
According to the Tenth Circuit’s formulation, when classifying a 
message as either government speech or private speech, the four factors to 
be considered are (1) whether the central purpose of the governmental 
program facilitating the message is to promote private views; (2) who 
exercises editorial control over the content of the message; (3) who is the 
                                                                                                                          
114 At least one federal court has reached a similar conclusion.  See WV Ass’n of Club Owners & 
Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 512 F. Supp. 2d 424, 436 (S.D.W. Va. 2007) (finding that an 
inquiry into the degree of a state’s editorial control “confuses rather than clarifies the analysis” in cases 
where the central purpose of the government program at issue was not to disseminate a governmental 
message). 
115 See Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001) (outlining the 
four prongs of the test). 
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literal speaker of the message; and (4) who bears ultimate responsibility for 
the content of the message.116  The Tenth Circuit claimed to draw the four-
pronged test from principles articulated in an Eighth Circuit opinion 
involving donor recognitions aired on National Public Radio and, to a 
lesser extent, from principles in a Ninth Circuit opinion involving a public 
school teacher’s postings on a school bulletin board.117  The court noted 
that the Eighth Circuit had alluded to such considerations in finding that 
donor acknowledgements, read on the air by employees of a local public 
radio station during the station’s broadcast of National Public Radio’s “All 
Things Considered” program, constituted government speech, and that 
therefore the station could exclude particular would-be donors and their 
messages based on viewpoint.118  And the Ninth Circuit had used 
somewhat similar considerations to conclude that where a public school 
had created a bulletin board for the purpose of supporting Gay and Lesbian 
Awareness Month, postings on that board by faculty or staff members 
constituted government speech and need not be viewpoint-neutral or 
represent a variety of views on the subject.119 
The Tenth Circuit used the four-pronged test to evaluate a city’s 
holiday display.  In Wells v. City and County of Denver, the city and 
county governments erected on the steps of a government building a 
display including “a creche, tin soldiers, Christmas trees, . . . an array of 
lights, . . . a shed containing Santa Claus and his elves,” and other 
decorations,120 all of which were owned and maintained by the 
government.121  Importantly, the city had built a large sign, which it erected 
as a part of the display, containing the message “Happy Holidays from the 
Keep the Lights Foundation and the sponsors that help maintain the lights 
at the City and County Building,”122 and then listing six corporate 
sponsors.123  A private organization, the Freedom from Religion 
Foundation, asked permission to have its own “Winter Solstice” sign 
erected within the display, but the government would not agree.124  The 
Foundation claimed that the “plain language of the [city’s] sign” indicated 
that the display as a whole was speech by the Keep the Lights Foundation 
and the other private sponsors, rather than government speech, and that the 
Freedom from Religion Foundation should have the right to have its 
                                                                                                                          
116 Id. 
117 See Downs v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093–94 (8th Cir. 2000); 
see also Wells, 257 F.3d at 1141 (citing Downs, 228 F.3d at 1011–12). 
118 Knights, 203 F.3d at 1087–93. 
119 Downs, 228 F.3d at 1005–07, 1011–12. 
120 Wells, 257 F.3d at 1137. 
121 Id. at 1139. 
122 Id. at 1137. 
123 Id. at 1140 n.4. 
124 Id. at 1137–38. 
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message included.125  The court, however, applied the four-pronged test 
and found that the display, including the sign, constituted government 
speech.126 
In applying the first prong—asking whether the central purpose of the 
governmental program facilitating the message is to promote private 
views—the court inexplicably focused on the “purpose of the sign” rather 
than the purpose of any possible governmental program, such as the 
current year’s display or the “program” of erecting holiday displays.127  In 
this case, however, the variation probably did not affect the court’s 
conclusion; the court found that the sign’s purpose had nothing to do with 
promoting private views, and the display “program” as a whole seems even 
less connected to private messages than the sign alone.128  In determining 
that the sign was not intended to promote private views or messages, the 
court pointed to “the City’s complete control over the sign’s construction, 
message, and placement,” along with a government official’s testimony 
(which the lower court had credited, despite the sign’s actual wording) that 
the sign’s purpose was to express the government’s thanks to the 
sponsors.129  As to the second and third prongs, the court found that the 
government exercised editorial control over the content of the message and 
also was the literal speaker because “the City built, paid for, and erected 
the sign.”130  Finally, applying the fourth prong of the test, the court found 
that the government bore ultimate responsibility for the content of the 
display as well as the sign, since the government had provided security and 
a fence for the display and was in fact defending the display in this 
litigation.131  The court refused to add to the test a fifth factor suggested by 
the dissent—“who the listener believes to be the speaker”—but argued that 
even if this were one relevant factor, an informed and reasonable observer 
would conclude under all the circumstances that the display was 
government speech.132 
Since Wells was decided, other circuits have adopted its four-pronged 
test in deciding whether to classify a message as government speech.  
Several of these cases have involved specialty license plates. 
B.  The Fourth Circuit Adopts the Four-Pronged Test 
The earliest of these specialty license plate cases was a Fourth Circuit 
case in which Virginia had approved a specialty plate for the Sons of 
                                                                                                                          
125 Id. at 1140. 
126 Id. at 1142–43. 
127 See id. at 1141–42 (discussing the purpose of the sign). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 1142. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 1142–43. 
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Confederate Veterans (“SCV”) organization but refused to emboss the 
plates with the organization’s logo, which included the Confederate flag.133  
Although the state routinely approved logos for other organizations’ plates, 
it was apparently unwilling to allow the Confederate flag to appear on 
license plates because of the message the flag conveys.134  SCV objected, 
claiming viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment’s 
Speech Clause.135  The Fourth Circuit panel unanimously held that the 
messages on Virginia’s specialty plates constituted private speech, not 
government speech.136  While noting that the four-pronged test might not 
“constitute an exhaustive or always-applicable list,” the court applied the 
test anyway and found that all four prongs indicated private speech rather 
than government speech.137  Under the first prong the court examined the 
“‘purpose’ of the special plate program” and found that the purpose was to 
generate revenue for the state while allowing “the private expression of 
various views.”138  The court found under the second prong that editorial 
control over the content of specialty plate messages rested, as a practical 
matter, with the private organizations associated with each plate; whatever 
legal power the state had to design or control content was rarely if ever 
exercised until this case.139  The court discussed the third and fourth prongs 
together in a relatively truncated analysis of who is literally speaking on a 
specialty plate and who bears ultimate responsibility for those messages.  
After confessing that neither prong suggested a clear outcome in the 
context of specialty plates,140 the court progressed to the rather 
unremarkable observations that while the government owned the plates at 
all times, the plates were mounted on private vehicles, and the Supreme 
Court had suggested in Wooley v. Maynard that “license plates . . . 
implicate private speech interests”; from these observations, the court 
concluded that the third and fourth prongs, like the first and second, 
                                                                                                                          
133 Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 
610, 613 (4th Cir. 2002). 
134 See id. at 623 (“Although the logo restriction itself makes no reference to the Confederate 
flag . . . it was the inclusion of the Confederate flag in the SCV’s logo that led to the prohibition against 
the use of the logo on the SCV’s special license plate.”); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. 
Holcomb, 129 F. Supp. 2d 941, 946 (W.D. Va. 2001) (“[T]he motivation behind the Commonwealth’s 
ban of logos or emblems was to avoid controversy by preventing Plaintiffs from designing a plate that 
displays the Confederate battle flag.  Out of hundreds of specialty plates in existence, only that bearing 
the Sons’ logo is targeted.”); Corbin, supra note 27, at 621 (“[T]he Virginia legislature probably did not 
want the divisive image of the Confederate flag linked to the State.”). 
135 Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 622. 
136 Id. at 621. 
137 Id. at 619–21. 
138 Id. at 619. 
139 Id. at 621. 
140 Id. (“The ‘literal’ speaker here might be said to be the license plate itself . . . and who bears 
‘ultimate responsibility’ for the speech is unclear.”). 
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indicated private speech rather than government speech.141 
Although the Supreme Court has never adopted the four-pronged test 
for identifying government speech, former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
has very recently applied it in a unanimous opinion she wrote while sitting 
by designation on a Fourth Circuit panel, thus demonstrating the Fourth 
Circuit’s application of the four-pronged test outside the specialty plate 
context.142  Importantly, the court did not recognize the existence of any 
third category of “mixed” or “hybrid” speech, but once again assumed a 
binary classification scheme, under which speech was either government 
speech or private speech.143  In this case, a city council, which traditionally 
had begun each of its meetings with an opening prayer offered by a council 
member, implemented a policy requiring all such prayers to be 
“nondenominational.”144  One of the council members claimed that the new 
policy violated several of his First Amendment rights, including freedom 
of speech.145  The court rejected this claim, however, on the ground that the 
prayers constituted government speech rather than private speech.  
Applying the four-pronged test, the court was first required to determine 
the purpose of the program in which the speech occurred.  The relevant 
“program,” according to the court, was not one particular prayer or one 
speaker’s prayers, but rather the policy of having council members offer 
prayers at council meetings.146  As to that program, the court readily 
concluded that the purpose was governmental because the meetings 
themselves served a governmental purpose and the prayers were listed on 
the agenda as an “official part” of every meeting; moreover, the content of 
the prayers usually included calls for the council to be granted wisdom and 
guidance as they performed their official duties.147  The court analyzed the 
second and third prongs together, concluding that the new policy itself 
evidenced that the government exercised “substantial editorial control” 
over the prayers and concluding that the government was the literal 
                                                                                                                          
141 Id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977)).  Wooley, of course, did not involve 
specialty plates; the case involved a motorist’s claim that a state motto, embossed on all standard-issue 
plates, was a form of compelled speech as to those motorists who were required to purchase and 
display the plates.  See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s decision in 
Wooley). 
142 Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 354 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 
S. Ct. 909 (2009). 
143 Id. at 354–55.  Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the court cited Sons of Confederate Veterans  
but ignored Planned Parenthood of South Carolina, Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004).  Rose 
was an intervening specialty plate case in which a Fourth Circuit panel had applied the four-pronged 
test but had suggested, in at least two of the three separate opinions, that the test showed that messages 
on specialty plates constitute neither purely government speech nor purely private speech, and thus fit 
into a putative third category called “hybrid” speech.  Planned Parenthood of S.C., 361 F.3d at 792–93, 
800–01.  For a discussion of Rose, see infra notes 215–216, 228–248, and accompanying text. 
144 Turner, 534 F.3d at 353–54. 
145 Id. at 354. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
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speaker because anyone offering such a prayer was only allowed to speak 
“by virtue of his role as a Council member.”148  The most difficult question 
to answer, said the court, was the fourth prong question of who bears 
ultimate responsibility for the content of the message.149  The court noted 
that the council members who offered prayers did “take some personal 
responsibility for their [council] prayers.”150  But without pursuing this 
analysis further or reaching an explicit conclusion under the fourth prong, 
the court concluded that on the whole, “given the focus of the prayers on 
government business . . . we agree with the District Court that the prayers 
at issue are government speech.”151 
C.  The Ninth Circuit Adopts the Four-Pronged Test 
Quite recently, the Ninth Circuit was called to distinguish government 
speech from private speech in the specialty plate context, and it too 
assumed a binary approach and applied the four-pronged test.152  As in the 
Bredesen case,153 “Choose Life” plates were at issue here; but in this case, 
rather than disallowing pro-choice plates, the state of Arizona disallowed 
“Choose Life” plates.154  Arizona had not authorized any kind of pro-
choice plates, either, although no evidence showed that any group had 
requested them.155  The state government contended that it denied the 
application for “Choose Life” plates because it wished to keep all 
messages about abortion and abortion rights off of specialty plates.156  The 
government further contended that such a restriction was permissible 
because any messages on specialty plates (or any other license plates) were 
government speech and, in the alternative, that the restriction was a 
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral limitation on the use of the specialty plate 
forum.157  Applying the four-pronged test, the Ninth Circuit panel 
unanimously found that messages on specialty plates constituted private 
                                                                                                                          
148 Id. at 354–55. 
149 Id. at 355. 
150 Id. 
151 Id.  The court provided additional support for this conclusion by citing Simpson v. Chesterfield 
County Board of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 279, 288 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that similar prayers at 
county board meetings, when offered by members of the local clergy selected by the board, constituted 
government speech).  Curiously, the Simpson case did not mention or apply the four-pronged test 
adopted earlier in Sons of Confederate Veterans, nor did it acknowledge the existence of a third, 
“hybrid” category of speech, as had been suggested by various opinions in Rose.  See supra note 143 
(demonstrating that two of the three separate opinions suggested that the four-pronged test showed that 
speech on specialty plates was neither purely private nor purely governmental). 
152 Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965–68 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
56 (2008). 
153 See supra notes 69–88 and accompanying text (discussing the Bredesen case, in which the 
court found “Choose Life” specialty plates to contain purely government speech). 
154 Ariz. Life Coal., 515 F.3d at 960–62. 
155 Id. at 961, 971. 
156 Id. at 972. 
157 Id. at 965, 971. 
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speech,158 and then went on to conclude that the state’s exclusion of all 
viewpoints about abortion and abortion rights was not a viewpoint-neutral 
restriction.159 
In applying the first prong of the government speech test, the court 
analyzed neither the purpose of all license plates nor the purpose of a 
single specialty plate design, but the purpose of the “specialty license plate 
program as a whole.”160  The court found the purpose of that program to be 
“revenue raising”161 and also “providing a forum in which philanthropic 
organizations . . . can exercise their First Amendment rights in the hopes of 
raising money to support their cause.”162  On the second prong’s question 
of editorial control, the court again found for the private organization, 
noting that “the idea of a ‘Choose Life’ license plate originated with Life 
Coalition,” who also “determined the substantive content of their 
message,” despite the state’s authority to set “guidelines for gaining access 
to the license plate forum.”163  Regarding the third prong, the court found 
that the evidence, while somewhat conflicting, predominately favored 
classifying private parties as the literal speakers, despite the government’s 
ownership of the plates; the court drew on Wooley for its primary 
support.164  And the court concluded under the fourth prong that private 
organizations bore ultimate responsibility for the message, since their 
organization’s motto and name would appear on the plates and the program 
placed the “burden . . . on the nonprofit organization” to “take the 
affirmative step of submitting an application” before any message would 
be authorized or communicated.165  Thus each of the prongs, according to 
the court, supported a finding of private speech. 
D.  The Seventh Circuit Joins In—Or Does It? 
The Seventh Circuit claimed to have employed the four-pronged test—
albeit in a truncated formulation—in a similar specialty plate case decided 
at the end of 2008, in which the state of Illinois disallowed a private 
organization’s application for “Choose Life” plates.166  Considering and 
then rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Bredesen,167 the Seventh 
Circuit found: 
                                                                                                                          
158 Id. at 965–68. 
159 Id. at 972. 
160 Id. at 965 (emphasis omitted). 
161 Id. at 966. 
162 Id. at 965. 
163 Id. at 966. 
164 Id. at 967. 
165 Id. at 967–68. 
166 Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 855–56 (7th Cir. 2008). 
167 Id. at 862–63.  For a discussion of Bredesen, see supra Part III (discussing how the Sixth 
Circuit held that a message constitutes government speech whenever the government retains the power 
to approve every word of the message). 
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[T]he approach of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits [is] more 
persuasive.  Their multi-factor test can be distilled (and 
simplified) by focusing on the following inquiry:  Under all 
the circumstances, would a reasonable person consider the 
speaker to be the government or a private party?  Factors 
bearing on this analysis include, but are not limited to, the 
degree to which the message originates with the government, 
the degree to which the government exercises editorial 
control over the message, and whether the government or a 
private party communicates the message.168 
In using this test, the court does not seem to have applied the above 
factors one by one, so much as generally kept them in mind as it listed a 
number of characteristics of the specialty plate program, some of which 
indicated government speech and some private speech.169  In the end, the 
court determined only that “there are enough elements of private speech 
here to rule out the government-speech doctrine.”170 
In fact, the very language of the Seventh Circuit’s “test” conceals more 
than it reveals.  The “approach of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits,” which 
the Seventh Circuit purported to adopt, was the four-pronged test; yet the 
Seventh Circuit refused explicitly to endorse that test.171  Even more 
confusingly, after applying its own formulation—a somewhat open-ended 
“reasonable person” attribution test—the Seventh Circuit framed its 
conclusion negatively:  “[T]here are enough elements of private speech 
here to rule out the government-speech doctrine; the messages on Illinois 
specialty license plates are not government speech.”172  But what are they?  
The court held that “private-speech rights are implicated” by the specialty 
plate program, but stopped short of saying whether the messages on 
specialty plates constituted private speech, hybrid speech, or something 
else entirely.173  Nevertheless, the court went on to employ forum analysis 
as if the messages constituted private speech, ultimately deciding that 
specialty plates were a nonpublic forum174 and yet upholding the state’s 
restriction in this case as a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral subject matter 
limitation within that forum.175 
                                                                                                                          
168 Choose Life, 547 F.3d at 863. 
169 Id. at 863–64. 
170 Id. at 864. 
171 Id. at 863. 
172 Id. at 863–64. 
173 Id. at 864. 
174 Id. at 864–65. 
175 Id. at 867. 
 394 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:365 
E.  The Eighth Circuit Applies the Four-Pronged Test to Answer “One Key 
Question” 
Most recently the Eighth Circuit, which the Tenth Circuit credited with 
originating the four-pronged test, has applied the test in deciding its own 
specialty plate case involving a state’s refusal to issue “Choose Life” 
plates.176  In doing so, however, the court followed the lead of the Seventh 
Circuit in characterizing its analysis as a mere inquiry into attribution: 
Our analysis boils down to one key question:  whether, under 
all the circumstances, a reasonable and fully informed 
observer would consider the speaker to be the government or 
a private party.  Notwithstanding the Sixth Circuit’s 
conclusion to the contrary, we now join the Fourth, Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits in concluding that a reasonable and fully 
informed observer would consider the speaker [of the 
message appearing on a specialty plate] to be the 
organization that sponsors and the vehicle owner who 
displays the specialty license plate.177 
But unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit answered the “one 
key question” of attribution by applying, explicitly and in order, the 
elements of the four-pronged test.178  Beginning with the first prong, the 
court determined that “[t]he primary purpose of Missouri’s specialty plate 
program is to allow private organizations to promote their messages and 
raise money and to allow private individuals to support those organizations 
and their messages.”179  Next, the court applied the second prong in 
pointing out that “[u]nder the Missouri statute, both the state and the 
sponsoring organization exercise some degree of editorial control over the 
messages on specialty plates.”180  Finally, the court applied the third and 
fourth prongs: after noting that private organizations submitted “a general 
description of the plate” for approval or rejection by a state legislative 
committee, and that the plates thus approved were designed by the 
organization and produced without further input from the state regarding 
content, the court concluded that “the organizations that sponsor the 
specialty plates and the vehicle owners who choose to purchase and 
display them are the literal speakers who bear the ultimate responsibility 
for the message.”181 
Then, going beyond the four-pronged test, the court went on to point 
                                                                                                                          
176 Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 871 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 
F.3d 995, 1004–05 (10th Cir. 2002) (discussing how the Eighth Circuit developed the test in Knights). 
177 Roach, 560 F.3d at 867. 
178 Id. at 867–68. 
179 Id. at 867. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 867–68. 
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out two other factors that would likewise lead a reasonable observer to 
attribute specialty plate messages to private speakers.  The first of these 
was the sheer number and types of different specialty plates issued by the 
state:  “With more than 200 specialty plates available to Missouri vehicle 
owners, a reasonable observer could not think that the State of Missouri 
communicates all of those messages.”182  The second additional factor was 
the absence of state compulsion: 
While Missouri requires a vehicle to display a license plate, 
the State does not compel anyone to purchase a specialty 
plate. . . . The sponsoring organization must apply for the 
specialty plate, and the vehicle owner must choose to 
purchase it.  Because the “Choose Life” plate is different 
from the standard Missouri license plate, a reasonable 
observer would understand that the vehicle owner took the 
initiative to purchase the specialty plate and is voluntarily 
communicating his or her own message, not the message of 
the state.183 
In the end, based on the four-factor test and the two additional factors, 
the court was convinced that specialty plate messages constituted private 
speech.  Again departing from the Seventh Circuit’s example, the Eighth 
Circuit made this conclusion explicit and unequivocal by stating that “the 
messages communicated on specialty plates are private speech, not 
government speech.”184  Without determining what type of speech forum 
the plates constituted, the court found that Missouri’s specialty plate 
program was facially unconstitutional because it allowed state officials to 
exercise viewpoint discrimination, which is forbidden in every type of 
forum, as they approved or disapproved applications for specialty plates.185 
 
F.  Difficulties with the Four-Pronged Test 
As the foregoing history demonstrates, recent applications of the four-
pronged test raise a few nagging concerns about it, in either its original or 
modified formulations.  First, some of the prongs seem to be unclear, or at 
least susceptible to varying definitions.  The first prong of the test—the 
central purpose of the program giving rise to the message—provides an 
example.  Although it did not apply the four-pronged test, the Sixth Circuit 
in Bredesen had to consider a factor similar to the first prong as it applied 
Johanns, and held that the relevant “program” was the particular statute 
                                                                                                                          
182 Id. at 868. 
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185 Id. at 868–70 & n.4. 
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authorizing “Choose Life” plates;186 in contrast, the Fourth, Eighth, and 
Ninth Circuits, applying the first prong of the four-pronged test, considered 
the relevant “program” to be the specialty license plate program;187 and the 
state has sometimes urged that the relevant “program” is the set of all 
policies regarding license plates.188  The four-pronged test apparently does 
not specify which program is the relevant one.  Another example of 
ambiguity can be found in the third prong of the test, requiring courts to 
determine who is the “literal speaker.”189  In some speech contexts the term 
“literal speaker” will no doubt have a clear meaning, but in many of the 
more troublesome cases, one suspects, it will not.  Specialty license plates 
provide a perfect illustration of the difficulty.  Who is the “literal speaker” 
of the message on a specialty plate: the motorist, who installed the plates 
and drives the car on which they are displayed; the state, who owns and 
prints the plates, who regulates their format, and whose name is 
emblazoned across the top; or the nonprofit organization, who likely 
designed the plate’s background and whose name, logo, and message are 
displayed there?  Or is the “literal speaker,” as the Fourth Circuit once 
suggested with a hint of frustration, the “license plate itself”?190  The words 
“literal speaker” are not self-defining in such contexts and tend to create 
more difficulties than they resolve. 
A second concern, related to the first, is that some prongs of the four-
pronged test seem often to point in multiple directions.  The “literal 
speaker” prong, as noted above, is flawed in this way.  As another 
example, consider the fourth prong: the determination of who bears 
ultimate responsibility for the content of the message.  A number of facts 
might reasonably bear on that question of “ultimate responsibility,” facts 
which may often point in different directions.  If “ultimate responsibility” 
is simply a question about attribution by a reasonable or average 
viewer/listener, we will want to assign “responsibility” to the entity whose 
name is affixed to the message (if any, and only one, is so affixed);191 if, 
                                                                                                                          
186 ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375–77 (6th Cir. 2006); see also supra notes 98–
106 and accompanying text (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s refusal to conclude that the specialty plate 
program was the relevant program). 
187 See Roach, 560 F.3d at 867; Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 
2008); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 
610, 619 (4th Cir. 2002); supra notes 138, 160, 179, and accompanying text (discussing the cases that 
held that the relevant program was the specialty plate program). 
188 See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal., 515 F.3d at 965. 
189 Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 621. 
190 Id. 
191 See Ariz. Life Coal., 515 F.3d at 967 (finding that Life Coalition bore ultimate responsibility 
for the message,  “Life Coalition submitted its motto to be placed on a specialty license plate that 
would also identify the organization by name”); see also Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 
863 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that the entire four-pronged test “can be distilled (and simplified) by 
focusing on the following inquiry:  Under all the circumstances, would a reasonable person consider 
the speaker to be the government or a private party?”). 
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however, this is also a question about who stands to lose financially if the 
message falls on deaf ears, that might suggest another entity altogether;192 
if it is also a question of who is liable if the message constitutes a tort or 
other actionable wrong, that may suggest a third entity;193 if it is also a 
question of who paid for the message or provides protection of the 
message, that might suggest yet other groups.194 
In light of such ambiguities, it is perhaps unsurprising that reasonable 
judges can and do disagree on outcomes under the four-pronged test.  The 
Tenth Circuit, for example, which originated the test in its four-part 
formulation,195 has recently divided over how to apply the test in the 
context of a Ten Commandments monument donated to a city by a private 
nonprofit group and now owned and displayed by the city in a city park.  
Shortly after the Tenth Circuit announced the four-pronged test in Wells,196 
the court applied the test to such a donated monument and concluded that 
the monument constituted private speech.197  This determination was 
adopted by the court, without discussion or application of the four-pronged 
test, in another case involving a similar monument five years later;198 Judge 
McConnell, however, joined by Judge Gorsuch, dissented from a denial of 
rehearing en banc in that case, arguing that the Wells four-factor test 
showed that such monuments constitute government speech.199 
The court’s decision in that case has now been reversed by the 
Supreme Court (without any discussion or application of the four-pronged 
test),200 but the disagreement among the judges of the Tenth Circuit 
illustrates some of the ambiguities inherent in the elements of the four-
pronged test.  Judge McConnell believed that the second and fourth prongs 
indicated government speech because the government “exercised total 
‘control’ over the monuments . . . [and] bore ‘ultimate responsibility’ for 
                                                                                                                          
192 For example, given the facts of Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the University of 
Missouri, 203 F.3d 1085, 1089–90 (8th Cir. 2000), one could argue that NPR’s donors bear “ultimate 
responsibility” for the donor acknowledgements that NPR broadcasts, precisely because it is the donor 
who stands to win or lose financially based on how favorably the message is received by NPR’s 
listeners. 
193 See Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that “this 
litigation [in which the City is a named defendant] is itself an indication that the City bears the ultimate 
responsibility for the content of the display”). 
194 See id. (finding that the City bore “ultimate responsibility” for the message because, inter alia, 
it provided “security for the display, including a fence to guard against theft and protect citizens from 
possible electrical hazards, . . . video cameras, . . . motion detectors, . . . and a security guard”). 
195 See supra notes 115–132 and accompanying text (discussing the four-pronged test). 
196 See id. 
197 Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1004–06 (10th Cir. 2002). 
198 Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 
1125 (2009). 
199 Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1175–77 (10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
200 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
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the monuments’ contents and upkeep.”201  The court had disagreed, holding 
that the second prong indicated private speech because “the [private donor 
organization] exercised complete control over the content of the 
Monument, turning over to the City of Ogden a completed product.”202  
And the court thought that while the government might have had “ultimate 
responsibility” for the content of the monument after it was donated, the 
other three prongs of the test indicated private speech and outweighed the 
fourth prong conclusion.203  In particular, the court thought that the first 
prong indicated private speech because “the central purpose of the Ten 
Commandments monument is to advance the views of the [private donor 
organization] rather than those of the City of Ogden.”204  Judge McConnell 
did not apply the first prong explicitly, but considering the language of that 
prong as quoted in Wells itself,205 one could surely object to the court’s 
decision to examine the purpose of the monument rather than the purpose 
of the “program”—perhaps the city’s policy about all the monuments 
displayed in its parks—which gave rise to the message.206 
Finally, Judge McConnell seems to have thought “ownership” of the 
“speech”—a factor not expressly listed in the four-pronged test—should be 
a determinative factor by itself in cases, like that of the donated monument, 
where ownership is not in dispute.207  This approach, however, raises its 
own questions.  First, is “ownership of the speech” demonstrated merely 
by ownership of the medium through which the speech is expressed (here, 
the monument and perhaps the park)?  If not, what counts as “ownership of 
the speech,” such that we can be certain the city owned the speech here?  
On the other hand, if ownership of the medium is enough, then Knights, the 
Eighth Circuit case that Judge McConnell said represented a more 
questionable case of ownership, should have been another easy case of 
government ownership of the message (and thus government speech), 
because the government owned the radio station used to communicate the 
message (and probably the paper upon which the message was written).  
And specialty license plates would represent another easy case of 
                                                                                                                          
201 Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d at 1177 (McConnell, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
202 City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1004. 
203 Id. at 1005–06. 
204 Id. at 1004. 
205 See Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Eighth 
Circuit relied on a number of factors: (1) that ‘the central purpose of the enhanced underwriting 
program is not to promote the views of the donors’. . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting Knights of the Ku 
Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093–94 (8th Cir. 2000))). 
206 See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “we 
must address [the] specialty license plate program as a whole”); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. 
Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 619 (4th Cir. 2002) (considering entire 
specialty plate program under first prong analysis). 
207 Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1176 (10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
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government speech, simply because the government clearly owns the 
plates.  These results seem too easy.  Second, and more fundamentally, 
why should government ownership of the medium, by itself, convert 
otherwise private speech into government speech?  If a city makes 
microphones available for any speakers who wish to speak in the city park, 
one would not typically assume that the speech is government speech, 
although the government clearly owns the media of communication.208 
Even if each of the four prongs were unambiguous by itself, the 
disagreement among the Tenth Circuit judges also reminds us that the test 
as a whole still leaves room for judicial doubt in the case of a “prong split.”  
How many of the factors must point in the same direction before we can 
reach a conclusion?  Conveniently, and perhaps not entirely by accident, 
courts most often seem to find that the prongs all point in the same 
direction;209 but if the result under one prong is an outlier, do the other 
three always outweigh it?210  What if two prongs indicate government 
speech and two indicate private speech—how are we to break the tie?211 
These problems with the four-pronged test are largely practical 
problems of implementation.  But a more fundamental flaw might lie in 
what the test actually measures.  Indeed, it is not at all clear that the four-
pronged test would lead to a finding of government speech even on the 
facts of Rust itself,212 which suggests that the test functions rather poorly as 
                                                                                                                          
208 See also id. at 1179 (Tacha, J., responding to dissent from denial of rehearing en banc) (“No 
one thinks The Great Gatsby is government speech just because a public school provides its students 
with the text.”). 
209 See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal., 515 F.3d at 965–68; Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 619–
21; Wells, 257 F.3d at 1141–42; Knights, 203 F.3d at 1093–94. 
210 See, e.g., Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1005 (10th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 
when three of the four prongs indicated private speech, the court resolved “[a]ny doubt” by taking 
account of “the after-the-fact nature of the [government’s] effort to claim adoption of that speech”); 
Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Va., 534 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding that a 
message constituted government speech when three prongs indicated government speech and evidence 
under fourth prong was equivocal). 
211 Compare Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d at 1176–77 (McConnell, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (arguing that the second and fourth prongs, indicating government speech, would be 
dispositive by themselves, regardless of the outcome under the first and third prongs), with Planned 
Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 793–94 (4th Cir. 2004) (arguing that when the first and 
second prongs indicate government speech and third and fourth prongs indicate private speech, a 
message constitutes “mixed speech” under four-pronged test). 
212 In Rust, federal law prohibited the distribution of certain federal “family planning project[]” 
funds to entities that provided abortion counseling or referrals, or which otherwise encouraged 
abortion.  Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178–80 (1991). Under the second prong, the government 
surely did not exercise much “editorial control” over any given statement by a doctor or employee of 
the recipient clinics; private persons were deciding all the details about what to say, except that they 
were not to speak about abortion.  Under the third prong, the “literal speaker” was clearly the private 
physician or clinic staffer.  Under the fourth prong, “ultimate responsibility” for whatever was said 
about family planning—in the eyes of the law or in the mind of an average listener—arguably rested 
with the clinic rather than the federal government.  The majority of the four prongs thus indicate private 
speech, not government speech.  And the first prong, assessing the “central purpose of the program in 
which the speech occurred,” might indicate either governmental or private speech, depending on 
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an estimation of government speech law. 
In a way, the shortcomings of the four-pronged test are not surprising.  
In announcing and applying these factors originally, the Eighth Circuit was 
focused on evidence that seemed relevant to decide the case before it; the 
court does not seem to have considered or intended that these factors 
would be used to identify government speech across a range of cases.213  
But the Supreme Court has never given a very clear test for identifying 
government speech, so when other circuits were subsequently forced to 
differentiate government speech from private speech, they latched onto the 
Eighth Circuit’s factors, formulated them into a four-pronged test, and 
applied that test in a variety of contexts.214  The move is somewhat 
understandable; courts obviously prefer to have clear law to apply.  But 
close inspection of the test shows that it is neither “clear” nor the “law” as 
so far announced by the Supreme Court. 
V.  THE “HYBRID” OR “MIXED” SPEECH APPROACH 
Separate from, and perhaps prior to, the question of whether to employ 
the four-pronged test is the question of whether to adopt a binary approach 
to classifying speech.  Most circuits have embraced such an approach, 
assuming any given speech is either government speech or private speech.  
At least one circuit case, however, suggests that speech might be more 
complex, so that in some situations both governmental and private 
elements are present and the speech cannot be classified as one or the 
other.215  The proposed solution is the recognition of a new category of 
blended, “hybrid,” or “mixed” speech, denoting speech that is 
simultaneously governmental and private.216  A few commentators, too, 
have recently embraced this third category of speech.217  While some who 
have adopted this approach favor the four-pronged test for classifying 
                                                                                                                          
whether the “program” is defined as the federal grant program or a particular clinic’s program of family 
planning services.  See supra note 116 and accompanying text (stating the four prongs of the test). 
213 See Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093–94 
(8th Cir. 2000); supra note 118 and accompanying text; see also Wells, 257 F.3d at 1155 (Briscoe, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]t is not clear whether the court in Knights of KKK was creating a test to be applied in all 
government speech cases, or whether it was identifying the factors that evidenced government speech 
in that case.”). 
214 See supra Parts IV.A.–D. (discussing the formulation of the four-pronged test). 
215 See Rose, 361 F.3d at 794. 
216 See id. at 794 (Michael, J.) (finding specialty license plates to be “mixed speech” which is 
“neither purely government speech nor purely private speech”); id. at 800 (Luttig, J., concurring in 
judgment) (finding that “speech can indeed be hybrid in character” because “some speech acts 
constitute both private and government speech”); see also id. at 801 (Gregory, J., concurring in 
judgment) (finding that “license plate programs . . . ‘really have elements of both private and 
government speech’” and that “government speech interests . . . are implicated in the vanity license 
plate forum” (quoting Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor 
Vehicles, 305 F.3d 241, 252 (4th Cir. 2002) (Gregory, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc))). 
217 See supra note 27. 
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speech into one of the three categories,218 others advocate considering a 
somewhat different set of factors.219 
A.  Judges Who Have Advocated the “Hybrid” or “Mixed” Speech 
Approach 
Among federal judges, perhaps the earliest to suggest something like a 
hybrid speech category was Judge Mary Beck Briscoe of the Tenth Circuit, 
who asserted as she dissented in Wells that “the holiday display is not 
solely government speech, but contains private speech . . . .”220  If she had 
in mind a distinct third category of speech, however, Judge Briscoe did not 
elaborate on it. 
The leader of the judicial charge to recognize explicitly a hybrid 
speech category has been Michael Luttig, who was at the time sitting on 
the Fourth Circuit.  As early as 2002, in considering a request for rehearing 
in the Sons of Confederate Veterans case dealing with specialty license 
plates,221 Judge Luttig wrote separately to assert that while “to this point, 
the Supreme Court has always held that speech is either private or 
governmental,” this binary approach was the result of “doctrinal 
underdevelopment.”222  Judge Luttig continued: 
[A]lthough the doctrine may not have previously recognized 
such, speech in fact can be, at once, that of a private 
individual and the government . . . I believe that, with time, 
intellectual candor actually will force the Court . . . to fully 
recognize this fact doctrinally . . . . 
I am [also] convinced that our court in turn will, upon 
reflection, conclude that at least the particular speech at issue 
in this case is neither exclusively that of the private 
individual nor exclusively that of the government, but, rather, 
hybrid speech of both.  Indeed, as I have thought about the 
matter, I believe that the speech that appears on the so-called 
“special” or “vanity” license plate could prove to be the 
quintessential example of speech that is both private and 
governmental because the forum and the message are 
essentially inseparable . . . .223 
Two years later, in the Rose case involving specialty plates, Judge Luttig 
                                                                                                                          
218 See, e.g., Rose, 361 F.3d at 792–94. 
219 See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 27, at 627 (discussing the possibility of a five-prong test). 
220 Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1154 (10th Cir. 2001) (Briscoe, J., 
dissenting). 
221 See supra notes 133–39 and accompanying text (discussing Sons of Confederate Veterans). 
222 Sons of Confederate Veterans, 305 F.3d at 245 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
223 Id. 
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continued to defend his conception of hybrid speech—this time bringing 
one or two other Fourth Circuit judges along with him—but did not further 
explain the contours or implications of the hybrid speech category.224 
The significance of recognizing a hybrid speech category depends on 
how such a category will be used.  What legal standards apply to hybrid 
speech?  In Sons of Confederate Veterans, Judge Luttig disclaimed any 
intent “to foretell those limitations here,”225 but nevertheless opined that 
viewpoint discrimination by the government should be forbidden as to 
hybrid speech if three factors were present: (1) “the government has 
voluntarily opened up for private expression property that the private 
individual is actually required by the government to display publicly”; (2) 
the private speech component of the hybrid speech is “significant”; and (3) 
the government interest is “less than compelling.”226  Believing all three 
factors to be present with respect to specialty license plate programs, Judge 
Luttig agreed that it was unconstitutional for the state to deny, on the basis 
of viewpoint, an organization’s request to include the Confederate flag in 
its specialty plate design.227  Subsequently in Rose, Judge Luttig did not 
take any further steps in developing a standard to apply to hybrid speech, 
instead simply citing his earlier position in Sons of Confederate Veterans 
that viewpoint discrimination should be forbidden with respect to the 
particular form of hybrid speech appearing on specialty license plates.228 
His colleague on the Rose panel, Judge Blane Michael, provided a 
fuller discussion.  In his own separate opinion, Judge Michael applied the 
four-pronged test from Sons of Confederate Veterans, found that the first 
two prongs pointed toward government speech and the last two prongs 
pointed toward private speech, and concluded from this that the specialty 
plate speech was “mixed speech” which was “neither purely government 
speech nor purely private speech.”229  Without specifying a test that could 
be applied to all such mixed speech, Judge Michael pointed to three 
factors, quite different from Judge Luttig’s, which led him to conclude 
similarly that viewpoint discrimination would be impermissible with 
regard to this particular form of mixed speech: (1) the specialty plates 
constituted a limited forum for expression which the state had created; (2) 
the government had favored itself as a speaker within that forum; and (3) 
the state’s one-sided advocacy might not be apparent to average viewers of 
                                                                                                                          
224 See supra note 216. 




228 Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 800–01 (4th Cir. 2004) (Luttig, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
229 Id. at 793–94 (Michael, J.). 
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the plates.230 
Judge Michael’s opinion raises some troubling questions.  First, while 
proceeding on the assumption that the four-pronged test is legally binding, 
Judge Michael used the test to reach a “mixed speech” conclusion that was 
never recognized as a possibility in the precedents which had created the 
test.231  Along the same lines, the opinion gives no indication of what 
showing is necessary under the four-pronged test to qualify particular 
speech as “mixed.”  In this case, two prongs were said to point in one 
direction and two in the other;232 but is this necessary, or sufficient, for a 
finding of “mixed speech”?  Was the decisive factor which particular 
prongs pointed in a single direction, or the fact that two did, or the fact that 
not all did?  The opinion leaves all of this unclear. 
More important, perhaps, are the particular standards Judge Michael 
applied to mixed speech in concluding that viewpoint discrimination was 
forbidden.  First, there is the finding of a forum: he noted that the 
government’s restriction of this mixed speech was suspicious because the 
government, in creating a specialty plate program, had created a limited 
forum for expression.233  But by definition, one might assume, a speech 
forum is a place that contains some purely private speech.234  If the only 
messages in the “forum” are mixed speech containing some governmental 
component, that in itself might well be proof that no forum exists—at least 
not of the sort known to precedent.  Judge Michael’s finding of a forum 
was based primarily, if not exclusively, on the fact that those carrying the 
mixed speech on their cars were volunteers who were not “enlist[ed]” by 
the state, as were the doctors in Rust.235  But then why was their speech in 
the specialty plate “forum” not purely private speech?  Putting aside the 
question whether the actual message-bearers in Rust (the doctors)236 or in 
Johanns (the media outlets)237 were any less “volunteers” than the 
motorists in Rose, one wonders how the finding that the motorists were 
volunteers can be held to indicate that the government intentionally created 
a forum for speech, but not to indicate the presence of any purely private 
speech.  Can there be such a thing as a “mixed speech forum,” a forum 
                                                                                                                          
230 Id. at 795–96 (Michael, J.). 
231 These precedents are Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of University of Missouri, 203 F.3d 
1085 (8th Cir. 2000), Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2001), and Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 
610 (4th Cir. 2002).  See supra notes 117–43 and accompanying text. 
232 Rose, 361 F.3d at 793–94. 
233 See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
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containing only mixtures of governmental and private speech?  If all the 
speech includes some governmental component, in what sense is there a 
public forum—or a forum of any kind?238 
Second, there is the focus on attribution:  Judge Michael claimed that 
in a mixed speech context, when a state has “favored itself”239 as a 
“privileged speaker” within a limited forum (in this case, by authorizing a 
plate that promotes the government’s view and refusing to authorize a plate 
promoting a competing view)240 and average viewers do not readily 
attribute the one-sided message to the state, viewpoint discrimination is 
forbidden.241  Since viewpoint discrimination would presumably be 
inherent in the governmental component of any mixed speech, this boils 
down to the assertion that a government crafting messages for mixed 
speech in a forum must clearly identify itself as a speaker.  This command, 
however, seems contrary to Supreme Court precedent, as it would elevate 
attribution to the status of a determinative factor in certain situations. 
The Supreme Court, by contrast, has not focused on attribution as a 
key factor in identifying government speech or in determining whether 
viewpoint discrimination is permissible—in fact, quite the opposite.  No 
doubt viewpoint discrimination would be less likely if the average listener 
would be readily able to link the speech to the government; but the 
Supreme Court has pointedly allowed viewpoint discrimination even where 
the public does not attribute the message to the government, noting that 
“the correct focus is not on whether the ads’ audience realizes the 
government is speaking, but on the [government program’s] purported 
interference with respondents’ First Amendment rights.”242  True, the 
Court in that case had found the presence of pure government speech.243  
But under Judge Michael’s analysis, the speech there might well have 
qualified as mixed speech instead: the government had funded pro-beef ads 
that were designed by a combination of governmental and private actors; 
the ads were conveyed through private media outlets as literal speakers; 
and the ads often carried a statement announcing that they were “Funded 
by America’s Beef Producers,” making no mention of governmental 
involvement.244  On any reasonable understanding, the government was 
speaking covertly and the ads were not viewpoint-neutral; yet the Court 
upheld the arrangement as government speech, rather than striking it down 
                                                                                                                          
238 Cf. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 206 (finding that neither a public library nor the internet 
terminals it provided constituted a public forum because such a library “provides Internet access, not to 
‘encourage a diversity of views from private speakers,’” but for other reasons (quoting Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995))). 
239 Rose, 361 F.3d at 795. 
240 Id. at 798. 
241 Id. at 795–96, 799. 
242 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 564 n.7. 
243 Id. at 563–64. 
244 Id. at 553–55, 560–61. 
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as forbidden viewpoint discrimination regarding mixed speech.245 
Judge Luttig’s approach is also problematic, though for different 
reasons.  His proposal for limiting government control of “hybrid” speech 
was tailored to situations in which “the government has voluntarily opened 
up for private expression property that the private individual is actually 
required by the government to display publicly.”246  In such situations—
assuming the private speech component of the hybrid speech was 
“significant”—he would only allow viewpoint discrimination if the 
government had a “compelling” interest.247  It is difficult to imagine what 
speech would be governed by this rule aside from specialty or vanity 
license plates.248  What other government property is legally required to be 
displayed by private citizens and also serves as a government-designated 
forum for their speech?  In fact, one might well argue that even vanity and 
specialty plates do not constitute property that any private individual is 
required to display publicly; although vehicle owners are required to 
display a license plate of some kind, no owner is required to display a 
vanity or specialty plate, containing some element of her own speech.249  
At best, then, Judge Luttig’s prescription seems to provide guidance for 
how to treat hybrid speech only in the narrow context of specialty plates, 
and hinges the permissibility of viewpoint discrimination on the somewhat 
arbitrary standard of a compelling governmental interest; at worst, it 
provides no guidance even in the context of specialty plates. 
B.  Professor Corbin’s “Mixed Speech” Approach 
Some commentators have likewise embraced the hybrid or mixed 
category for speech.250  Providing the most extended defense of this 
approach, Caroline Mala Corbin has recently proposed the recognition of a 
“mixed speech” category, setting forth a five-factor test for classifying 
speech as governmental, private, or mixed:  “(1) Who is the literal speaker? 
(2) Who controls the message? (3) Who pays for the message? (4) What is 
the context of the speech (particularly the speech goals of the program in 
which the speech appears)? (5) To whom would a reasonable person 
attribute the speech?”251  As Professor Corbin conceives this test, there is 
                                                                                                                          
245 Id. at 560–67. 
246 Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 305 F.3d 
241, 247 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc); see supra note 226 and 
accompanying text. 
247 Id. 
248 Indeed, Judge Luttig disclaimed any intention of fashioning a broad rule for all hybrid speech.  
See Sons of Confederate Veterans, 305 F.3d at 246–47. 
249 See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 868 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e note that the messages 
communicated through specialty plates are voluntary, not compulsory.  While Missouri requires a 
vehicle to display a license plate, the State does not compel anyone to purchase a specialty plate.”). 
250 See supra note 27. 
251 Corbin, supra note 27, at 627. 
 406 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:365 
no worry regarding indeterminate factors or a division of conclusions 
among factors, for “unless all factors point exclusively to private speech or 
exclusively to government speech, the speech is mixed.”252  Applying this 
test to specialty license plates, Professor Corbin (perhaps unsurprisingly) 
finds the plates to be mixed speech, “fall[ing] squarely in the middle of the 
private/government speech spectrum.”253  The literal speaker, she finds, is 
“both the government and the private car owner”;254 control over the 
message is exercised to a “substantial degree[]” by “both the government 
and the individual car owner”;255 funding for the speech rests primarily 
with private speakers, “though the government plays a funding role as 
well”;256 the speech goals of the program are “inconclusive and difficult to 
evaluate,”257 as “is often the case for both government-subsidized speech 
and speech in a nonpublic forum”;258 and finally, “[a] reasonable person is 
unlikely to attribute the message . . . solely to private speakers or solely to 
the government.”259  In short, four of the five factors lead to inconclusive 
results, failing to indicate that either the government or a private entity was 
speaking alone, and the other factor shows that private speech elements 
predominate over admittedly present governmental speech elements. 
One suspects this sort of result will not be unusual in applications of 
Professor Corbin’s five-pronged test.  For example, she asserts that 
“religious speech in private schools, such as prayers led by parochial 
school teachers, becomes mixed speech when the schools accept 
government vouchers.”260  The Supreme Court, of course, has held that 
such speech is not attributable to the government in any way, because the 
government’s money was distributed to private individuals who then 
voluntarily chose to give it to a religious school rather than a secular 
one.261  What of religious universities that accept federal grant and loan 
funds, such as Pell Grants—does all speech in religious universities (even 
speech by the students) become mixed speech because the universities 
accept government funds that effectively enable the speech?  The beef ads 
in Johanns, characterized by the Supreme Court as government speech, 
would apparently become mixed speech,262 as would all government-
                                                                                                                          
252 Id. at 628. 
253 Id. at 640. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. at 641. 
256 Id. at 642. 
257 Id. at 643. 
258 Id. at 643 n.199. 
259 Id. at 646. 
260 Id. at 624. 
261 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652–53 (2002). 
262 The beef ads were funded by a federal government program to encourage beef consumption 
and were communicated to the public through private media outlets.  The government was seemingly 
not the “literal speaker” (prong one) and would not be associated with the speech in the public mind 
(prong five), but funded the speech (prong three) and exercised significant control over it (prong two).  
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subsidized “private” speech, including the student publications at issue in 
Rosenberger.263  Federal and state tax exemptions presumably help to “pay 
for” speech in churches too—does all speech from the pulpit become 
mixed speech because of prong three? 
Other prongs in the five-prong formulation appear to be almost 
guaranteed to produce equivocal results (and therefore result in an overall 
finding of mixed speech): the first prong, for example, requires judges to 
determine the identity of the “literal speaker,” a term which is all too 
unclear in many speech applications.264  Prong four, analyzing the speech 
goals of the program in which the speech appears, includes the nebulous 
terms “program”265 and “speech goals.”266  By the terms of the test, of 
course, the inability to reach a clear result under any single prong requires 
a finding of mixed speech.267  Thus, Professor Corbin’s approach means at 
least this: much speech that courts have previously determined to be 
“private” or “governmental” would now be treated as “mixed.” 
Professor Corbin admits that her definition of mixed speech “cuts a 
wide swath and [would] significantly change First Amendment 
jurisprudence.”268  Effectively, however, the change would only be as 
drastic as her prescription for what to do with mixed speech once it has 
been classified.  Along these lines, she proposes applying “some 
intermediate level of scrutiny to measures that constitute viewpoint 
discrimination on mixed speech.”269  Her test would allow the government 
to impose such restrictions only if “(1) it has a closely tailored, substantial 
interest that is clearly and publicly articulated; (2) it has no alternate means 
of accomplishing the same goal; and (3) private speakers have alternate 
means of communicating to the same audience.”270  Applying this 
“rigorous intermediate scrutiny”271 to specialty license plates, she 
concludes that most types of viewpoint restrictions would not pass the test, 
                                                                                                                          
See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text (providing relevant factual references for Johanns v. 
Livestock Marketing Association, 544 U.S. 550 (2005)). 
263 See Corbin, supra note 27, at 690 n.474 (“The Rosenberger Court’s characterization of the 
student publication as purely private speech is itself debatable.”).  For a brief discussion of 
Rosenberger, see supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text. 
264 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.  Professor Corbin, in fact, cautions those applying 
this prong to be aware that some anonymous speech is hard to trace to any literal speaker, and some 
ostensibly literal speakers may in fact be working as agents for someone else—in which case, 
presumably, the literal speaker analysis may change.  Corbin, supra note 27, at 629–30. 
265 For the difficulties inherent in defining the relevant “program,” see supra notes 186–88 and 
accompanying text. 
266 Professor Corbin notes that for “government-subsidized speech” as well as any “speech in a 
nonpublic forum,” the results under this prong will “often” be “inconclusive and difficult to 
evaluate”—which means the speech must be classified as mixed.  Corbin, supra note 27, at 643 n.199. 
267 Id. at 628. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. at 675. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
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but regulations prohibiting hate speech and religious endorsements 
would;272 she also suggests that prohibitions on certain other “distasteful” 
speech, such as “sexually provocative messages,” might pass the test, 
although she does not explicitly apply intermediate scrutiny to those 
restrictions.273  In any event, she avers, much of the benefit of intermediate 
scrutiny would be to force judges to do explicitly what she believes they 
already do implicitly; applying intermediate scrutiny to a wide range of 
mixed speech “renders transparent the inevitable balancing [of 
governmental and private interests] that courts perform.”274 
Applying intermediate scrutiny to such a large class of speech 
restrictions, however, is problematic.  First, the many forms of speech that 
would be swept into this mixed speech category differ from one another in 
important ways.  There are important differences, for example, between a 
federal grant program funding beef ads that is designed to promote beef 
consumption,275 on the one hand, and a public university program funding 
student pamphlets that is designed to foster the expression of diverse 
student views on campus,276 on the other.  The former program is a part of 
a class of programs in which government has determined to reach an 
audience with a particular message and has paid private parties to carry 
that message;277 the latter program is a part of a very different class of 
programs in which the government has determined to provide resources for 
private parties to create and convey their own messages.278  These 
differences might be important enough to justify categorical deference to 
the government’s viewpoint  restrictions within the former type of program 
and categorical suspicion of such restrictions within the latter type.279 
Second, it is not self-evident that the traditional categorical treatment 
                                                                                                                          
272 Id. at 681–91. 
273 Id. at 687–89. 
274 Id. at 691. 
275 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553–55 (2005). 
276 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 823–27 (1995). 
277 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61. 
278 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828–29. 
279 Indeed, this has been the Supreme Court’s approach to date, as it has applied the government 
speech doctrine and forum doctrine, respectively, to these cases.  See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541–42 (2001) (contrasting the application of government speech doctrine in 
Rust with the application of forum doctrine in Rosenberger).  And even Professor Corbin does not 
advocate abandoning the private speech and government speech categories entirely.  See Corbin, supra 
note 27, at 671, 692 n.480 (noting that “where the private or government components are sufficiently 
attenuated, courts may fairly categorize the speech as purely private or purely governmental”).  This is 
curious if, as she asserts, those categories simply allow judges to mask a secret ad hoc decision process.  
See id. at 677–78 (stating that “categorizing mixed speech as private or governmental” is problematic 
because it allows judges to “make a value-informed decision” to label the speech without articulating 
how they are balancing the competing interests).  In other words, if it is so important for judges to 
balance explicitly the competing interests in mixed speech cases, why should they not do so in all 
speech cases?  Why not subject all speech restrictions to intermediate scrutiny?  Might the judgment in 
a particular case that “private or government components are sufficiently attenuated” itself be masking 
a behind-the-scenes, value-informed balancing process that is never articulated? 
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simply masks ad hoc judicial balancing that already goes on behind the 
scenes—or that if it does, imposing intermediate scrutiny on restrictions of 
mixed speech will cause judging to be more forthright or consistent.  In an 
effort to force judges to show their cards in mixed speech cases, Professor 
Corbin would require them to consider explicitly whether a given 
restriction is supported by a “substantial” governmental interest and 
whether the government could accomplish the same goal by other 
means.280  But her evaluation of specialty license plates under this test 
provides a perfect illustration of the possibility of continued subterfuge.  It 
turns out that, in her view, government reasons for banning particular plate 
designs are not “substantial” enough unless the designs would endorse 
religion (such as, perhaps, a “God Bless America” plate) or convey hate 
speech (such as a Nazi plate).  Which governmental interests are 
prioritized, and which devalued, in reaching such conclusions?281  The 
ranking of governmental interests in such an analysis is necessarily tied to 
a behind-the-scenes ranking of the harmfulness of particular viewpoints.  
Some viewpoints, apparently, are deemed more harmful than others, 
making the state interest in restriction (or disassociation) more 
“substantial” for some messages than for others.  On what basis would a 
judge rank various viewpoints according to harmfulness?  And would any 
judge articulate such a ranking?  It seems fanciful to expect that 
intermediate scrutiny will force judges to do so; moreover, a ranking of 
this sort by a judge or other government official runs directly contrary to 
the First Amendment value of viewpoint neutrality toward speech. 
C.  Difficulties With the “Hybrid” or “Mixed” Speech Approach More 
Generally 
The “hybrid” or “mixed” speech approach is intuitively appealing 
because it recognizes the overlap at the margins between the conceptual 
categories of government speech and private speech.  By forcing all speech 
into one of these two categories, we are bound to generalize and, in the 
process, ignore some key differences. 
But the hybrid speech category does this, too.  In fact, it is the function 
                                                                                                                          
280 Corbin, supra note 27, at 675–76 (using the case of specialty license plates to illustrate the 
application of the “intermediate scrutiny” test and the resulting advantages of its application in the 
courtroom). 
281 Regarding the hypothetical rejection of “God Bless America” plates, the state’s interest in 
complying with the Establishment Clause probably cannot count as a “substantial” interest, since the 
Court has suggested that such governmental endorsements of “God” do not violate the clause.  See Van 
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686–92 (2005) (holding that the placement of a monument inscribed 
with the Ten Commandments is not a violation of the Establishment Clause); County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 602–03, 657, 671–74 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White & Scalia, JJ.) (cautioning against placing too much weight 
on a few religious words that have been used throughout the United States’ heritage).  Indeed, our 
national motto is “In God We Trust.”  36 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). 
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of jurisprudential categories to generalize, and the fact that two (or even 
three) categories do so is not in itself a reason to create a third (or fourth), 
particularly if the newly minted category does not give judges much 
guidance for deciding who wins when speech falls within that category.  
Moreover, there is value, confirmed by long experience, in setting up a 
presumption against viewpoint restrictions directed against the messages of 
private speakers.  But to apply that presumption effectively, we must 
distinguish between the messages of private speakers and the messages of 
public speakers.  Arguably, the mixed speech category is not a serious 
attempt to do that; it looks more like giving up. 
A broad “mixed” or “hybrid” speech category may even allow 
government to game the system by actually creating one of the mixed-
speech factors in order to convert private speech into mixed speech, thus 
forcing increased judicial deference to viewpoint restrictions.  For instance, 
when the government wants to oppose a private point of view, it could 
simply give itself prior approval authority over private speech in some 
venue and thus claim that the speech is mixed speech because, under prong 
two, the government exerts substantial “control” over the message.  In that 
case, the restriction itself is being used as evidence that the message is 
partially the government’s and that the government therefore has a greater 
interest in imposing the restriction.  This is circular. 
It is not impossible to conceptualize the two-category approach.  A 
government may deny resources to a few disfavored speakers—and even 
forge alliances with competing speakers—without really intending to send 
any message of its own.  Judges need not sense some element of 
“government speech” in such arrangements or shield such viewpoint-
biased discrimination from normal free speech scrutiny.  The danger that 
government will use discriminatory allocations of its property to silence a 
certain viewpoint or skew debate is no less real when some of the private 
competing viewpoints (predictably enough) conspire with the government 
to accomplish this result, or at least to advance their own preferred 
messages. 
VI.  AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THREE KINDS                                              
OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH 
Assuming we wish to continue allowing the government to send its 
own messages, it is plainly necessary for judges to be able to identify 
government speech across a wide range of Speech Clause cases.  
Additionally, to the extent government may violate the Establishment 
Clause with its own expression, judges need to be able to identify 
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government speech in that context as well.282  It seems desirable to use one 
uniform test for identifying government speech in all contexts, since there 
is no obvious reason to define the term differently in Speech Clause and 
Establishment Clause cases.  As noted in Parts IV and V, neither the four-
pronged test nor the hybrid speech approach shows much promise of 
helping judges make more uniform or objective decisions, nor do these 
approaches track closely the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in the 
area of government speech. 
This section suggests a simpler approach to identifying government 
speech, a test which explains and reconciles the holdings of the Supreme 
Court across the gamut of its speech and establishment cases.  
Additionally, this section argues that this simpler test offers a more 
accurate measurement of what matters in the definition of government 
speech and, because it is less subjective than the alternatives, is likely to 
result in more judicial consistency as well. 
The Supreme Court has found government speech to be present in 
perhaps three key circumstances.  Accordingly, the proposed test would 
pose three questions: 
(1) Did the government independently generate the idea of 
reaching an audience with this particular message in this 
medium? 
(2) Was the message expressed in a medium or format 
effectively owned and controlled by government and clearly 
reserved for the purpose of expressing only those messages 
the government regards as its own, never opened to multiple 
private speakers for the purpose of raising revenue or 
supporting their speech or welfare? 
(3) Is there a clear literal speaker who is employed by the 
government to send messages on this subject in this format? 
If any of the above questions must clearly be answered in the 
affirmative, then the message is government speech; otherwise, the 
message is private speech.  The remainder of this section explains each of 
these three circumstances in more detail. 
A.  Did the Government Independently Generate the Idea of Reaching an 
Audience with This Particular Message in This Medium? 
A central concept in the whole notion of government speech is the idea 
                                                                                                                          
282 See infra notes 381–88 and accompanying text (discussing Establishment Clause violations 
caused by certain kinds of government speech). 
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that government should be free to express its own messages.283  But how 
do we know whether the message is really “its own message” or, instead, 
that of a private party?  This first factor focuses on the most obvious 
meaning of “its own message”: that the government came up with the 
message in the first place, or at least embraced it enough to generate the 
idea of communicating it to an audience in this medium. 
In Rust v. Sullivan—the case which, according to the Supreme Court, 
contained the first exposition of the government speech doctrine—
Congress came up with the idea of reaching an audience (the clients of 
family planning clinics) with a particular message (encouraging family 
planning without abortion) through the “medium” of the advice rendered 
by physicians and staff working in the clinics.284  The Court clearly 
believed all of this was Congress’s idea, a finding which was crucial in 
classifying the message as government speech:  “The Government can, 
without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage 
certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same 
time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem 
in another way.”285  The Court later described the Rust opinion as showing 
that the government can “use[] private speakers to transmit specific 
information pertaining to its own program” and “to promote a particular 
policy of its own.”286  Similarly in Johanns, the Court’s conclusion that the 
beef ads constituted government speech was anchored in the finding that 
“[t]he message set out in the beef promotions is from beginning to end the 
message established by the Federal Government.”287  The fact that the 
literal speakers were private entities, and the fact that some private actors 
exercised some editorial control in the creation of the ads, were factors of 
secondary importance, at most:  “When, as here, the government sets the 
overall message to be communicated and approves every word that is 
disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the government-speech 
doctrine merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental 
sources in developing specific messages.”288  The fact that the government 
“sets the overall message” is surely crucial to a finding of government 
speech. 
Just as certainly in other cases, the fact that the government did not 
“set the overall message” was an important factor in the Court’s 
determination that the message constituted private speech.  Hence, in 
                                                                                                                          
283 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“[W]e have 
permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or 
when it enlists private entities to convey its own message.”). 
284 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178–81, 193–94 (1991). 
285 Id. at 193. 
286 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (emphasis added). 
287 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–61 (2005) (emphasis added). 
288 Id. at 562 (emphasis added). 
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Rosenberger, the Court found viewpoint restrictions on university-funded 
student speech to be improper because the government had not crafted or 
“favor[ed]” any particular message but instead had “expend[ed] funds to 
encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.”289  Similarly, in 
Southworth, although the university made no claim that the state-
subsidized student extracurricular speech was government speech, the 
Court recognized that viewpoint discrimination might be permissible if 
“the state-controlled University’s . . . own funds [were being used] to 
advance a particular message.”290  And in Velazquez, while recognizing 
that the federal funding program for legal services attorneys was not 
designed with the purpose of “encourag[ing] a diversity of views,” the 
Court emphasized that viewpoint discrimination was improper because the 
program was not designed “to promote a governmental message.”291  The 
attorneys receiving this governmental funding would in fact be 
representing clients in claims against the government; therefore, the 
government could not have intended these attorneys to convey a particular 
message set by the government, “even under a generous understanding of 
the concept [of governmental speech].”292 
Governments might conceivably “set the overall message” either by 
crafting the message themselves or by adopting a message or slogan 
originally developed by others.  In this latter case, however, it is important 
to be sure that the government has in some meaningful sense originated the 
communication, rather than just selectively subsidizing private 
communication, a move that would skew private debate and perhaps run 
afoul of existing forum doctrine.293  The origination question attends to this 
concern by asking whether it was the government’s idea to use this 
medium to reach an audience with the particular message being sent.  For 
example, if the government wants to embrace the privately originated 
slogan “Just Do It” as part of a government program to encourage fitness, 
the fact that Nike originally crafted the slogan should not prevent a finding 
of government speech when the government pays for the development and 
broadcast of television ads containing the slogan.  Assuming Nike and the 
government reached an agreement as to the government’s use of the 
slogan, the crucial factor to consider is whether the government 
intentionally embraced the slogan and originated the idea of running these 
television ads containing it.  If so, then those ads constitute government 
                                                                                                                          
289 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834. 
290 Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (emphasis 
added). 
291 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001). 
292 Id. at 542–43. 
293 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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speech.294 
On the other hand, this kind of government speech will not include the 
types of messages that the Supreme Court has held to be private speech in 
a government forum.  For example, a message expressed by demonstrators 
in city streets and parks will not be deemed government speech under 
question one because it was the private speakers’ idea, not the 
government’s, to reach an audience with this particular message.295  The 
government’s idea was not to send an “overall message,” but rather to open 
up public property for the expression of various yet-to-be-determined 
private messages.  Likewise, the messages expressed in student group 
publications on public university campuses will not constitute government 
speech under question one, because it was not the school’s idea to reach an 
audience with the particular messages contained in the publications.296  If 
these messages do not count as government speech under the other two 
questions either, then the messages would be private speech, and it follows 
that governmental viewpoint discrimination in such contexts would be 
impermissible.297  By the same token, messages endorsing religion in such 
forums would raise no Establishment Clause concerns because there would 
be no state action embracing the particular message; the governmental role 
was limited to opening up government resources to private speakers on a 
viewpoint-neutral and religion-neutral basis.298 
                                                                                                                          
294 Of course, other ads featuring the slogan “Just Do It” would not be government speech, to the 
extent that Nike and not the government came up with the idea of reaching an audience with those 
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295 See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 757–60 (1995) 
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discrimination against private student speech, even when it receives university funding). 
297 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828–30, 834 (reviewing cases in which the Court struck down 
viewpoint discrimination against private speech); Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 761 (holding that while 
the state may regulate the “time, place, and manner” of private speech in public forums, it is sharply 
restricted in regulating “content”); see also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 
672, 678–79 (1992) (noting that governmental discrimination based on viewpoint is forbidden in all 
speech forums). 
298 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839–42 (noting the acceptability of state university funding 
directed to a student religious publication when the university funded all student journals); Capitol 
Square, 515 U.S. at 762–63 (reiterating the maxim that private religious speech in a public forum does 
not equal the government endorsement of religion). 
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B.  Was the Message Expressed in a Medium or Format Effectively Owned 
and Controlled by Government and Clearly Reserved for the Purpose 
of Expressing Only Those Messages the Government Regards as Its 
Own, Never Opened to Multiple Private Speakers for the Purpose of 
Raising Revenue or Supporting Their Speech or Welfare? 
While the first question of the three-question test will likely be 
sufficient to identify the majority of government speech, a relatively small 
amount of what the Court has considered government speech does not arise 
in that way.  In fact, in an opinion just issued in Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, the Supreme Court has clarified that government speech can also 
be created when a government accepts, embraces, and communicates a 
donated message.299  Private entities may originate messages and design 
communicative media containing those messages, and then donate the 
media/messages to the government.  If the government chooses to reject 
the donation, as it surely would have a right to do,300 then presumably no 
government speech arises from the attempted donation;301 but if the 
government chooses to accept and display the donated property, the 
government now owns and controls the property and may have embraced 
communication of the message so strongly that the message of that 
particular display ought to be regarded as governmental speech.302  This 
would seem particularly true if the display, or the property on which it is 
erected, has been clearly reserved for the expression of government 
messages rather than being opened to multiple private speakers. 
A common scenario is the donated monument.  Suppose a private civic 
group designs and pays for construction of a six-foot-tall granite 
monument containing the text of the Ten Commandments, and then offers 
to donate the monument to a state government for display on the grounds 
of the state capitol building, where nearly forty other state-owned historical 
monuments and markers are displayed over twenty-two acres.303  The state 
chooses to accept the donation and allow the display, so the state selects 
the precise site for the monument, and the group pays for the erection of 
                                                                                                                          
299 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1138 (2009). 
300 See, e.g., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1089, 
1093–95 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 814 (2000) (holding that a publicly owned radio station 
was permitted to reject the donation of funds from the Ku Klux Klan, and refuse to acknowledge such 
donation on air, based on viewpoint and reputation of the Klan). 
301 See id.  In Knights, the Eighth Circuit found that the government’s on-air acknowledgements 
of underwriters constituted government speech—but of course, the Klan’s particular message did not 
constitute government speech, since the government rejected the donation and refused to acknowledge 
the Klan.  See id. at 1093. 
302 Again, the same message on a different, privately owned display on private property would not 
be government speech under this factor, just as a privately originated “Just Do It” ad would not count 
as government speech under the first factor.  E.g., supra note 294 and accompanying text. 
303 The facts presented here are taken from Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681–82 (2005) 
(plurality opinion). 
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the monument there and also adds an inscription naming the group and 
specifying that the group “presented” the monument to “the people and 
youth” of the state.304 
The first question of this Article’s three-factor test will not clearly 
indicate in this scenario that the monument is government speech, because 
it was the private organization, not the government, that independently 
generated the idea of reaching an audience with this particular message in 
this medium.  The government did not come up with the idea for the 
monument independently, but only erected it at the suggestion of the 
private group.  Answering the second question, however, clarifies that the 
monument is indeed government speech; the media, both the monument 
and the capitol grounds, were owned and controlled by the government and 
clearly reserved for expressing only those messages that the government 
regarded as its own.  The media and format are important.  Here, although 
the government may (at least implicitly) invite private speakers to 
demonstrate in person in its parks or other public spaces, the city has not 
even implicitly invited private parties to erect unattended, permanent 
monuments there.  The format of the park and the monuments standing in 
it strongly indicate that unattended park monuments are reserved for 
government messages. 
The Supreme Court focused on exactly these considerations while 
addressing very similar facts in Pleasant Grove.305  The Court noted that 
one could assume the public grounds were never opened generally to 
private speakers’ monuments for the purpose of encouraging private 
speech or raising revenue, and the government did not actively encourage 
donations of monuments; every donated monument had likely been 
screened by the government, not just to assure that no distasteful message 
was present, but to assure that the message was something the government 
wanted to say—something “worthy” of being displayed on the grounds.306  
The donated monument may have begun as private speech, but under these 
circumstances, when the government accepted and displayed it, it became 
government speech.  The upshot of this determination is that no private 
speech rights are violated when the government refuses to accept and 
display some other group’s donation; and on the other hand, any religious 
endorsements on successfully donated and displayed monuments must be 
considered the state’s expression for Establishment Clause purposes.  This, 
indeed, seems to be the way the Supreme Court has viewed such 
monuments even before the most recent term—although in 2005 the Court 
determined, on one set of facts involving Ten Commandments monuments, 
                                                                                                                          
304 Id. 
305 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132–35 (2009). 
306 Id. at 1132–34. 
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that such a state expression did not violate the Establishment Clause.307 
Moreover, the reasoning in Pleasant Grove suggests that a “donated” 
display could be considered government speech even if legal ownership of 
the donated property itself were less clear, as long as the other 
considerations noted above were still present and the government exercised 
a sort of effective ownership and control over the display.  Thus if a 
monument were designed and funded by a private group, and the group 
then asked the government for permission to erect it as a permanent fixture 
on government property in front of the county courthouse,308 the 
government’s affirmative grant of permission would arguably convert the 
monument’s message into government speech, whether or not the 
government ever became the legal owner of the monument.309 
Similarly, the Supreme Court has found an improper governmental 
endorsement of religion—which indicates that the government was 
expressing something—when a government agreed to allow a private 
organization to display a crèche on government property and to store the 
crèche in a governmental storeroom when it was not being displayed.310  
This case involved both a crèche and a menorah.  The crèche was 
technically the property of a private Catholic organization called the Holy 
Name Society,311 and the menorah was technically the property of a private 
Jewish organization called Chabad,312 but both the crèche and the menorah 
remained at all times on government property, being stored and maintained 
by the government even when not on display, and were decorated by 
government employees during the holiday season.313  The menorah was 
even assembled, erected, and disassembled by government employees,314 
                                                                                                                          
307 See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691–92 (plurality opinion) (referring to monuments on the grounds 
of Texas State Capitol as “[Texas’s] Capitol grounds monuments” and upholding the display of a Ten 
Commandments monument because “Texas’ display of this monument” did not violate Establishment 
Clause (emphasis added)); id. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he State sought to reflect 
moral principles.”).  While I assert that Ten Commandments monuments under these circumstances 
constitute government speech, and also that a majority of justices suggested as much in Van Orden, I 
express no opinion here regarding the ultimate outcome in Van Orden or the proper application of the 
Establishment Clause to such monuments. 
308 See Staley v. Harris County, 461 F.3d 504, 506–07 (5th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 485 F.3d 
305 (5th Cir. 2007) (referring to the placement of a privately constructed monument at the main 
entrance of a courthouse). 
309 The Fifth Circuit found that such a display, which contained an open Bible, violated the 
Establishment Clause because “the monument . . . had come to have a predominately religious 
purpose.”  Id. at 515.  Since private entities and their messages cannot violate the Establishment 
Clause, the opinion seems to be premised on the assumption that the government was speaking by 
displaying this monument.  The opinion nowhere mentions who legally owned the monument after it 
was erected—perhaps because no one knew.  The consideration seems to have been irrelevant. 
310 ACLU v. County of Allegheny, 842 F.2d 655, 657 (3d Cir. 1988), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
311 Id. at 657. 
312 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 587 (1989) (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens & 
O’Connor, JJ.). 
313 ACLU, 842 F.2d at 657–58. 
314 Id.; County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 587 (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.). 
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and the crèche was flanked by a plaque stating that the crèche had been 
“‘Donated by the Holy Name Society.’”315  A majority of the Court found 
that, under the circumstances, the government had impermissibly endorsed 
religion by allowing display of the crèche;316 while a different majority 
found that by allowing display of the menorah, flanked by a large 
Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty, the government had either 
endorsed something besides religion,317 or had endorsed religion 
permissibly.318  But in any case, the analysis suggests that both displays 
involved government speech—that is, governmental endorsement of 
something—notwithstanding the fact that the crèche and the menorah were 
technically owned by private groups.319 
Although it is a closer case, the government’s broadcast of the 
messages written by donors in Knights probably also gave rise to 
government speech.320  In that case, a government-owned radio station 
received monetary donations from a variety of private entities and was 
required under federal law to “acknowledge[] on air any individual or 
group source of funding for a particular broadcast matter,” although the 
acknowledgements had to be “value neutral” and could not “promote” the 
donor.321  The announcement might be drafted in the first instance by the 
donor itself or by the government, but the wording of all such underwriting 
announcements had to be approved by the government before being read 
on air by a government employee.322 
Not all speech broadcast by public stations is the same type of speech.  
The Supreme Court noted two years prior to Knights that “[w]hen a public 
broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the selection and presentation 
of its programming, it engages in speech activity,” and that “[such] 
programming decisions . . . constitute communicative acts.”323  The Court 
also held in that case, however, that “candidate debates [broadcast by 
                                                                                                                          
315 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 580 (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.). 
316 Id. at 601–02 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, & O’Connor, JJ.). 
317 Id. at 616 (Blackmun, J.). 
318 Id. at 662–63, 670–71 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J., and White & Scalia, JJ.). 
319 See infra notes 381–82 and accompanying text; see also Wells v. City & County of Denver,  
257 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2001), supra Part IV.A. (discussing Wells).  The holiday display in Wells 
seems to have been the property of the government, either donated by private entities or partially 
funded by them.  See id. at 1137–38.  But even if the components of the display, including the sign, had 
all been created by private sponsors and donated to the city for display on public property, it is difficult 
to believe the court would have concluded under the four-pronged test that the message involved 
private and not government speech.  See id. at 1141–43 (applying the test and concluding that the 
display constituted government speech).  And this result would be the same under the second question 
of the test this Article proposes for identifying government speech. 
320 Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1087–89 (8th 
Cir. 2000) (stating the facts of the case). 
321 Id. at 1088. 
322 Id. at 1088, 1094 n.10. 
323 Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998). 
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public broadcasters] present the narrow exception to the rule”324 and 
constitute a nonpublic speech forum.325  These results are predictable under 
the test this Article suggests.  When public broadcasters choose what to 
broadcast, the content choices are government speech under question one 
of the three-question test, because the government came up with the idea of 
reaching an audience in this medium with that content.  In analyzing 
candidate debates, however, the focus shifts to the particular messages 
delivered by each candidate.  The government in no way endorses what 
each candidate says, simply by broadcasting the debate.  The debate—to 
the extent it is broadcast by a public broadcasting station—thus constitutes 
a government-provided speech forum of some type for private speakers.  
Applying the three-question tests yields the same result: the government 
did not independently generate the idea of reaching an audience with a 
particular candidate’s message (say, decreasing taxes or building a new 
road); nor was the literal speaker a government employee; and while the 
medium and format in which the messages appeared were effectively 
owned by the government, the medium and format were not clearly 
reserved for the purpose of expressing government-approved messages. 
The more difficult question is the classification of the underwriting 
announcements in Knights.  The Eighth Circuit found the messages to 
constitute government speech.326  The second factor of the three-factor test 
suggests this result as well.  Factor one would not indicate government 
speech because the government did not come up with the idea of reaching 
an audience with the particular message drafted by, say, the Smith 
Charitable Trust.  But under the circumstances, the second factor is 
probably satisfied because the government-owned medium and format here 
were clearly reserved for the purpose of expressing government messages, 
not to raise revenue or encourage private speech.  The revenue-raising part 
of the analysis is the closest call, but on the whole, the acknowledgement 
program does not seem to have been put in place to encourage donations to 
the station, but rather to satisfy legal requirements, and perhaps 
secondarily, to give donors a “free gift”—akin to the ubiquitous tote bag 
offered to donors by a number of charitable organizations.327  The 
“message,” in the form of written words on a piece of paper, may or may 
not have been “donated” by a private group along with its money, but the 
government’s affirmative decision to accept and read the donated 
message—along with all the other facts present here, including government 
ownership and control of the medium—makes this look like government 
                                                                                                                          
324 Id. at 675. 
325 Id. at 676. 
326 Knights, 203 F.3d at 1093. 
327 See id. (noting that the program is enforced by federal statute and is an “acknowledgement” 
and not a promotion). 
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speech.  In addition, the fact that private speakers were never allowed to 
speak freely on public radio underwriting spots—value bias and promotion 
of products or organizations being forbidden by the government—makes 
this program substantially different from governmental programs widely 
inviting the public to buy ad space to promote private groups and 
messages,328 and suggests that even privately composed underwriting 
messages constitute government speech when they are accepted, approved, 
and read on air by government employees in order to comply with federal 
law. 
C.  Is There a Clear Literal Speaker Who Is Employed by the Government 
to Send Messages on This Subject in This Format? 
The first and second questions of the proposed test will likely identify 
most of the speech the Supreme Court has called “government speech” in 
its cases to date.  But the Supreme Court has suggested in Garcetti v. 
Ceballos329 that there may be one further way a message could be deemed 
government speech.  Hence, the third question is included here. 
In Garcetti, a deputy district attorney wrote a memorandum to his 
supervisors recommending dismissal of a pending criminal case due to 
misrepresentations contained in an affidavit that had been used to obtain a 
critical search warrant.330  His supervisors decided to proceed with the 
prosecution anyway, and the trial court later rejected the defense’s 
challenge to the warrant.331  In a subsequent action invoking his rights 
under the Speech Clause, the deputy district attorney claimed that after 
these events he was subjected to a series of adverse employment actions 
which were designed to retaliate against him for the memorandum.332  The 
Court rejected his First Amendment claim on the ground that “his 
expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy” and 
therefore did not constitute protected private speech:  “[W]hen public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees 
are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes . . . .”333  In 
other words, those statements are government speech, not private speech. 
This holding fits tolerably well with the government speech doctrine, 
at least if one may assume that government employees who speak 
“pursuant to their official duties” have been hired by their employers to 
convey the government’s messages.  In such cases, the employee’s 
governmental superiors must be allowed to approve the messages even 
                                                                                                                          
328 For a discussion of such programs, see infra notes 354–62 and accompanying text. 
329 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
330 Id. at 413–14. 
331 Id. at 414–15. 
332 Id. at 415. 
333 Id. at 421. 
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before they are released, as well as to discipline the employee after 
publication if she failed to tailor the message to the government’s 
expectations about the content of what is, after all, its own message.334  On 
the other hand, if the message does not arise from the employee’s message-
sending duties—if the speaker is not employed to send messages on this 
subject in this medium—then the message might well constitute private 
speech, particularly if it concerns a matter of public interest.335  And of 
course, if it is unclear who the “literal speaker” is, the speech cannot be the 
kind of speech that the Court found in Garcetti.336 
The third factor of the proposed government speech test is designed to 
make sure Garcetti speech is identified as government speech, assuming 
there might be cases where neither of the first two factors clearly indicate 
this.  Of course, the speech appearing within a calendar deputy’s 
disposition memo will constitute government speech under the first factor 
if “the government” may be said to have come up with the idea of 
rendering the particular advice contained in the memo; but where a 
government employee expresses a viewpoint at odds with that of his 
supervisors, as in Garcetti, it will be difficult to reach such a conclusion.  
Under the second factor of my test, the memo will constitute government 
speech if the medium and format (here, intra-office memos sent by 
government employees within a government office) were effectively 
owned and controlled by the government and reserved for the purpose of 
expressing government-approved messages, not private speech.  It might 
well be thought that the Garcetti facts indicate precisely this kind of 
government speech.  But on the other hand, one might argue, the very fact 
                                                                                                                          
334 I do not intend to express any view about the difficult cases that may arise in particular 
applications of the Garcetti rule—for example, when employment status or duties are unclear.  See id. 
at 424–25 (noting that the scope of an employee’s duties could be a matter for “serious debate” in 
future cases, and noting that speech by academics that is “related to scholarship or teaching” could 
present an especially difficult case); id. at 436, 438–39 (Souter, J., dissenting).  In such cases, the third 
question might not indicate government speech.  Similarly, the third question would not indicate 
government speech if the identity of the “literal speaker” were unclear in a particular case.  For a 
discussion of some of the difficulties in identifying “literal speakers,” see supra notes 189–90 and 
accompanying text. 
335 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419 (“[S]o long as employees are speaking as citizens about matters 
of public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their employers 
to operate efficiently and effectively.” (internal citations omitted)); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. 
High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 573–74 (1968) (“Statements by public officials on matters of 
public concern must be accorded First Amendment protection despite the fact that the statements are 
directed at their nominal superiors.”). 
336 No doubt “literal speakers” are difficult to identify in many situations.  See supra notes 189–90 
and accompanying text (illustrating this difficulty).  But this poses no difficulty in prong three of the 
proposed test, because whenever a literal speaker cannot clearly be identified, the solution is clear: 
there can be no finding of government speech under this prong.  In other words, unlike the four-
pronged test, the test does not require the identification of a “literal speaker” of every message; the 
“literal speaker” factor is not serving as one of several factors to be weighed together in distinguishing 
between government and private speech in every situation.  Question three merely sniffs out one kind 
of government speech: the kind arising when there clearly is a literal speaker employed by the 
government and having particular job responsibilities. 
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that “rogue memos” like this one are sent belies effective governmental 
control of the medium and indicates that not all messages sent in this 
medium and format are “government-approved.”  Additionally, it might be 
argued, the Garcetti Court did not focus on government ownership and 
control of the medium, but upon the employment status and duties of the 
literal speaker.337  Accordingly, the third factor is offered here to cover the 
instance of the employee paid by the government to send government 
messages, who then sends messages contrary to the government’s wishes; 
the purpose is to make doubly sure that speech sent pursuant to such 
duties—even noncompliant speech—is classified as government speech in 
cases where employment status and duties to send government messages 
are clear.338  Not only does this treatment accord with Supreme Court 
precedent, but it is probably necessitated by the whole notion of 
government speech.  The government needs to be able to assure that those 
it employs to convey government speech are doing so accurately; if the 
government cannot control the content of its intended messages, the 
government speech doctrine would become a nullity.339 
VII.  USING THE THREE-PART TEST TO UNDERSTAND                                 
PAST AND FUTURE CASES  
A.  Explaining Supreme Court Precedents 
The three-part test for identifying government speech is intended to be 
descriptive.  I have suggested the test, not just as a straightforward way of 
measuring what seems to be the essence of government speech, but also as 
a method of describing what the Supreme Court has actually found to be 
government speech.  In other words, the three-factor test provides a 
method of reconciling the Supreme Court precedents.  Applying the test to 
the Court’s establishment and free speech cases yields results that mirror 
those reached by the Court. 
1.  Private Speech 
As a starting point, the Court has been clear that governmental funding 
of speech does not always create government speech.  The Court has 
squarely held that “even in the provision of subsidies, the government may 
                                                                                                                          
337 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420–22 (noting that a “controlling factor” in Ceballos’s case was that 
his speech was made pursuant to his duties “as a calendar deputy”). 
338 See supra note 334 (discussing this aspect of the third factor). 
339 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422–23 (“Official communications have official consequences, 
creating a need for substantive consistency and clarity.  [Governmental] [s]upervisors must ensure that 
their employees’ official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the 
employer’s mission.”). 
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not ‘ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas,’”340 a holding that only 
makes sense if government-funded speech sometimes constitutes private, 
not government, speech.  Hence, when a federal program disbursed grants 
to fund only art which program administrators considered to be of 
sufficient artistic merit and sufficiently representative of “general standards 
of decency,” the art thus subsidized was deemed private speech and the 
funding restrictions were required to be viewpoint-neutral, although no 
forum for speech was created.341  Similarly, when a federal program 
disbursed grants to pay legal services attorneys to represent private clients 
in claims against the federal government, the subsidized attorneys’ speech 
was deemed private speech and the funding restrictions were required to be 
viewpoint-neutral, although no forum for speech was created.342  And when 
the government expends its own funds to acquire books, internet 
connections and terminals, or other materials and resources for a public 
library or public school library, the Court has indicated that the messages 
contained in the materials and resources thus acquired still constitute 
private and not government speech, although the library is not a forum for 
speech.343  Decisions to remove materials from an existing library 
collection therefore must be viewpoint-neutral,344 although the Court has 
                                                                                                                          
340 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (quoting Regan v. Taxation 
With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)). 
341 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 586–87 (“If the NEA were to leverage its power to award subsidies on 
the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, then we would confront a 
different case.”); see also id. at 611 (“The Government freely admits . . . that it neither speaks through 
the expression subsidized . . . nor buys anything for itself with its . . . grants.”) (Souter, J., dissenting); 
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 366 (1984) (holding that a federal statute violated the 
Speech Clause by forbidding public broadcasting grants to be distributed to broadcasting stations that 
“engage in editorializing”; such editorials are private speech protected by the Speech Clause; and the 
funding restriction was too coercive); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 148–58 (1946) (finding 
that a postmaster violated the Speech Clause when he exercised authority to revoke second-class 
mailing privileges for publications he deemed to be insufficiently advancing public welfare; although 
speech contained in second-class mailings was subsidized by government, it was still private speech 
protected by the First Amendment, and the postmaster’s content rules were too arbitrary and 
restrictive); cf. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1100–01 (2009) (finding that a state 
law prohibiting public employee payroll deductions to fund a union’s political activities did not violate 
the Speech Clause; although the union’s political activities constituted private speech, the payroll 
restriction was viewpoint-neutral); Regan, 461 U.S. at 540 (federal tax regulations did not violate the 
Speech Clause by denying certain beneficial tax status to private organizations that devoted a 
substantial part of their activities to political lobbying; although the lobbying messages constituted 
private speech protected under First Amendment, the regulations were viewpoint-neutral). 
342 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541–43, 547–49 (2001). 
343 See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 203–07 (2003) (plurality opinion) 
(noting that internet access, in a public library, bought with public funds, facilitates communication by 
private parties but does not constitute a public forum for such speech); see also id. at 236 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]n extreme cases [one could] expect particular [book acquisition] choices [by public 
libraries] to reveal impermissible reasons (reasons even the plurality would consider to be illegitimate), 
like excluding books because their authors are Democrats or their critiques of organized Christianity 
are unsympathetic.”); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866–72 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
344 See Pico, 457 U.S. at 870–72 (holding that “local school boards may not remove books from 
school library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books”). 
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suggested that heightened judicial scrutiny is inappropriate in the context 
of decisions, necessitated by limited funds, whether to acquire certain 
materials in the first place.345 
The three-factor test would likewise indicate private speech in each of 
the instances above, even if no forum was created.  In none of these cases 
did the government independently generate the idea of reaching an 
audience with any of the particular subsidized messages; nor were the 
funded messages expressed in a medium or format effectively owned by 
government and clearly reserved for government messages; nor was the 
literal speaker a governmental employee.  But varying the facts slightly 
could yield a different result.  For example, if the government expends 
funds as a patron commissioning particular works of art for display to the 
public on public property, the funded artwork might well constitute 
government speech, for two independently sufficient reasons: (1) the 
government may have independently come up with the idea for the 
particular work of art and for its ultimate display in this medium, before 
the work was commissioned; and (2) when the artwork was finally 
displayed, the medium and format of the display would be effectively 
owned by the government and likely reserved for governmental messages, 
not opened to multiple private speakers.346 
Of course, when the government does create or maintain a speech 
forum, at least some speech within that forum will be private speech,347 and 
the restrictions on use of the forum must be viewpoint-neutral.348  
Unfortunately, the Court has not been entirely clear about what counts as a 
“forum” for these purposes.  The Court has distinguished between the 
“traditional public forum,” the “designated public forum, whether of a 
limited or unlimited character,” and “all remaining public property.”349  
Since that enumeration, the Court has also suggested, logically enough, 
that there is an important distinction to be made within the latter category 
between a “nonpublic forum” and other public property which is not a 
                                                                                                                          
345 See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 205 (“Just as forum analysis and heightened judicial 
scrutiny are incompatible with the role of public television stations and the role of the National 
Endowment for the Arts, they are also incompatible with the discretion that public libraries must have 
to fulfill their traditional missions.”); see also Pico, 457 U.S. at 871–72 (“[N]othing in our decision 
today affects in any way the discretion of a local school board to choose books to add to the libraries of 
their schools . . . . [O]ur holding today affects only the discretion to remove books.”). 
346 See Finley, 524 U.S. at 610–11 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting the permissibility of viewpoint 
discrimination in such contexts). 
347 See supra notes 233–38 and accompanying text. 
348 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983) 
(noting that when governmental property functions as any kind of speech forum, whether public or 
nonpublic, the government may not “suppress expression [in the forum] merely because public officials 
oppose the speaker’s view”). 
349 See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992) 
(defining each of the three types of forums). 
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forum of any type.350  The distinction is important because the existence of 
a forum—even a nonpublic one—will suggest the presence of private 
speech351 and the requirement of viewpoint neutrality,352 which will not be 
the case with all public property. 
The Court has not always used forum language precisely, a fact which 
sometimes poses challenges for understanding the Court’s conclusions and 
reconciling those with the government speech doctrine.  In Lehman v. City 
of Shaker Heights,353 a leading Supreme Court case about governmental 
programs to sell advertising space, a city sold ad space on public transit 
cars to a variety of commercial and non-commercial speakers.354  In 
upholding a city rule excluding political advertising from the ad space, a 
plurality of the Court stopped short of characterizing the ads as some kind 
of government speech, but did state flatly that “[n]o First Amendment 
forum is here to be found.”355  Taken literally, that means the ad space did 
not constitute even a nonpublic forum.  But Lehman was decided a decade 
before the forum doctrine was fully announced in Cornelius356 and Perry 
Education Association,357 and the literal reading does not square well with 
later opinions suggesting that forums are created when public property is 
opened to a variety of private speakers, such as advertisers358 or political 
candidates.359  Indeed, lower courts have subsequently interpreted the 
statement in Lehman to mean “no public forum is here to be found,” and 
that advertising spaces such as those at issue in Lehman constitute 
nonpublic forums.360  Even the Supreme Court itself has suggested this 
                                                                                                                          
350 See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 676 (1998) (noting that when a 
public television station aired a debate among political candidates, “the . . . debate was a forum of some 
type” and that “[t]he question of what type must be answered by reference to our public forum 
precedents” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 677 (“Other government properties are either nonpublic 
fora or not fora at all.”). 
351 See supra notes 233–38 and accompanying text. 
352 See supra note 348 and accompanying text. 
353 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974) (plurality opinion). 
354 Id. at 300–01. 
355 Id. at 304. 
356 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804–06 (1985) 
(holding that solicitation in the context of the Combined Federal Campaign is speech in a nonpublic 
forum). 
357 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983) (finding that an 
interschool mail system was a nonpublic forum). 
358 See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 675, 679 (1992) (finding 
airport terminals to be “generally accessible to the general public,” to contain “various commercial 
establishments such as restaurants, snack stands, bars, newsstands, and stores of various types,” and to 
be “nonpublic fora” for expression); see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (finding that an annual 
fundraising drive in the federal workplace constituted “a nonpublic forum”). 
359 See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 675–76 (1998) (holding that a 
publicly owned television station did not violate the First Amendment when it refused to allow a 
candidate to participate in the nonpublic forum of a televised debate). 
360 See DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 965–67 (9th Cir. 
1999) (citing Lehman as support for the holding that the advertising space on a public high school’s 
baseball field fence was a nonpublic forum); N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 
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interpretation in a later case.361  Probably the best reading of Lehman, then, 
is that the Court found the approved ads to constitute private speech in a 
nonpublic forum.  The three-factor test would likewise suggest that the ads 
constituted private speech:  The government did not come up with the idea 
to promote a certain brand of cigarettes or a certain church on public transit 
cars;362 nor were the ad spaces clearly reserved for government-endorsed 
messages; nor was the literal speaker a government employee. 
Many times, of course, the existence of a forum is more obvious.  
Hence when a city maintains a public square and allows a variety of 
religious and non-religious private demonstrators to express themselves 
there, the demonstrators’ messages are private speech (notwithstanding 
their location on public property and amidst public buildings), and as such 
do not raise Establishment Clause concerns when they endorse religion.363  
Moreover, when a public university subsidizes a fund which pays for the 
speech of a variety of student groups, the university has created a speech 
forum, the funded speech is private speech, and the funding restrictions 
must be viewpoint-neutral.364  And when a public school offers its facilities 
to a variety of private groups for “social, civic, or recreational uses” but 
denies use “by any group for religious purposes,”365 the school has created 
a speech forum, the speech in the forum is private speech, and the 
restriction forbidding religious uses cannot stand because it is not 
viewpoint-neutral.366 
The three-factor test would likewise indicate private speech in each of 
these instances involving forums.  The government did not independently 
generate the idea of reaching an audience with any particular message 
                                                                                                                          
129 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the Court in Lehman “ha[d] considered the forum non-public”).  
Sometimes, where past governmental policies have allowed broad access to the government’s ad space, 
courts have even distinguished Lehman and have found the space to constitute a designated public 
forum.  See Christ’s Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 255 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (“SEPTA has no long-standing practice of prohibiting ads like [the ones at issue in the case] 
. . . nor does it have any policy pursuant to which [the] ads were removed . . . . Because we find that 
SEPTA has created a designated public forum, content-based restrictions on speech that come within 
the forum must pass strict scrutiny to comport with the First Amendment.”); Planned Parenthood 
Ass’n/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1232, 1233 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that 
public transportation advertising space became a public forum because the government maintained “no 
system of control” over advertisements selected and had “allowed its advertising space to be used for a 
wide variety of commercial, public-service, and political ads”). 
361 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801 (noting that in Lehman, “the Court treated the advertising 
spaces on the buses as the forum” (emphasis added)). 
362 See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 300 (listing cigarette companies and churches as 
two of the groups that had advertised in the ad spaces). 
363 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760–63 (1995). 
364 Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229–33 (2000); 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995). 
365 Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387 (1993) (holding 
that denying a church access to school premises to show a religious film series violates the Freedom of 
Speech Clause). 
366 Id. at 391–94. 
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appearing in the forum; nor was the literal speaker a governmental 
employee; and while the messages were likely expressed in some medium 
or format effectively owned by government, the status of that property as a 
forum makes it unlikely that the medium and format were clearly reserved 
for government messages. 
The examples above illustrate that government support and funding of 
a message do not always create government speech, but the waters may be 
muddied further when it is unclear who really provided the funding.  Much 
depends on whether we are looking for the immediate source or some 
ultimate source.  The Court has determined that the source should be 
identified as the most immediate one we can find who had real control over 
fund allocation.  In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,367 a case involving public 
funding of an educational voucher program which allowed parents to direct 
the vouchers to private religious or non-religious schools if they wished, 
challengers asserted that the program violated the Establishment Clause 
because the program allowed public money to be used to fund religious 
expression in those recipient schools that were religious.368  The Court 
rejected the claim, holding in essence that the religious expression was 
private speech funded with private money, since parents chose whether to 
fund it.369  Of course, the money had come to the parents from the 
government at an earlier time; but if the parents’ spending choices were 
truly voluntary, the source of the religious schools’ funding was the 
parents, and the religious speech by private school teachers remained 
private.  The result is identical under the three-factor test:  The government 
did not come up with the idea of praising God in the classroom; the 
religious message was not expressed in a medium or format effectively 
owned by government; and the literal speaker was not a government 
employee. 
The physical setting or environment of speech can also make it 
difficult to determine whether the speech is governmental or private.  
Occasionally private speech can be identified even in settings of extensive 
governmental control, although the Court has sometimes been sympathetic 
to the government’s need to censor such private speech.  For example, 
when a journalism course in a public high school requires students in the 
course to produce a school newspaper, the Court has said that the student-
written articles in the newspaper constitute private speech370 and the 
                                                                                                                          
367 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
368 Id. at 644–48. 
369 See id. at 652–55. 
370 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–72 (1988) (referring multiple 
times to the issue as one involving “student speech” and “personal expression”); id. at 273 (referring to 
articles at issue as “student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities”). 
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newspaper might constitute a nonpublic forum,371 although it does not 
constitute a public forum.372  The Court held that the school is allowed to 
exercise a great deal of control over the content of such speech,373 but it is 
still private speech.  The three-factor test probably points to the same 
result, but it is admittedly a bit more difficult to apply here.  Government 
speech would not be indicated by factors one or three: it was the student’s 
idea, not the government’s, to write a newspaper story about the particular 
subject (in this case, students’ experiences with pregnancy and divorce),374 
and the literal speaker (the student author) was not a government 
employee.  But factor two is a closer call.  Because the government 
effectively owned the medium and format of communication (the school 
newspaper and school grounds), the question would boil down to whether 
this medium and format were clearly reserved for the purpose of 
expressing only governmental messages and not opened to multiple private 
speakers for their own expression.  If the newspaper often contained 
student opinions, it would probably be difficult to say the medium and 
format were clearly reserved, and on balance this factor would not indicate 
government speech either.  Even if the conclusion under this factor went 
the other way in this close case, however, the error might well be harmless, 
because of the Court’s determination that private speech in a public school 
newspaper can be subjected to extensive governmental censorship375—the 
same result which would obtain if the speech were regarded as government 
speech. 
2.  Government Speech 
Where the Supreme Court has found the presence of government 
speech, the speech is one of the three kinds listed in the three-factor test.  
Some cases of this sort have already been mentioned above.376  In addition 
to those, consider a handful of recent Establishment Clause cases in which 
the Court found the Clause was violated because of a message.377  Whether 
                                                                                                                          
371 See id. at 270 (describing actions of school officials with regard to school newspaper by saying 
that “they ‘reserve[d] the forum for its intended purpos[e]’” (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (emphasis added))). 
372 See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 267–70. 
373 Id. at 271–73 (noting that when a public school regulates expressive activities that “may fairly 
be characterized as part of the school curriculum,” the restriction may be broad and need only be 
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”). 
374 Id. at 263 (noting content of articles at issue). 
375 See supra note 373 and accompanying text. 
376 See supra notes 284–88 and accompanying text; notes 303–39 and accompanying text. 
377 I do not mean to suggest that this is the only possible kind of Establishment Clause violation.  
It may well be possible for the government to violate the Clause without “government speech.”  What I 
am arguing is that if the Clause is violated by a message, then that message must constitute 
“government speech.” 
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the standard used is the Lemon test,378 the endorsement test,379 or the 
coercion test,380 private speech alone cannot violate the Establishment 
Clause;381 a message cannot violate the Clause unless it was the 
government’s message.382  In cases where the Court has found that a 
particular message violated the Establishment Clause, the three-factor test 
would identify the message as government speech.  For example, when a 
public school scheduled public prayers into the agenda of its graduation 
ceremonies and invited a local clergyman to deliver the prayers, even 
advising him on the wording of the prayers, the prayers could be 
characterized as government speech under the first factor: the government 
(that is, a government employee—the school principal—acting in his 
official capacity) independently came up with the idea of reaching an 
audience with this message in the graduation ceremonies.383  Likewise, 
when a county erects a “Foundations of American Law and Government” 
                                                                                                                          
378 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (providing that the test requires the 
governmental action to satisfy three independent requirements: (1) it “must have a secular legislative 
purpose”; (2) “its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion”; 
and (3) it “must not foster ‘an excessive governmental entanglement with religion’” (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted)).  See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 859–65, 881 (2005) 
(applying the Lemon test); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 314–17 (2000) (applying 
the Lemon test). 
379 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 307–10 (providing a recent application of the 
endorsement test). 
380 See id. at 310–12 (providing a recent application of the coercion test). 
381 See, e.g., id. at 302 (“‘[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing 
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free 
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.’” (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. (Dist. 66) v. 
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion))); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. 
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) (“[P]rivate religious speech, far from being a First Amendment 
orphan, is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression.”). 
382 Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, has stated a view that at first sounds 
contrary to the one I am asserting, but upon investigation, the contradiction is largely illusory.  In one 
Establishment Clause case, she wrote, “I believe that an impermissible message of endorsement can be 
sent in a variety of contexts, not all of which involve direct government speech or outright favoritism.”  
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 774 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part).  On its face, 
this statement raises a question as to the meaning of “direct government speech.”  If “direct” is not a 
significant qualification, one wonders how a government can possibly send any “message of 
endorsement” without “speech.”  Later in the opinion, however, she clarified her view somewhat: 
Where the government’s operation of a public forum has the effect of endorsing 
religion, even if the governmental actor neither intends nor actively encourages that 
result, the Establishment Clause is violated.  This is so not because of . . . mistaken 
attribution of private speech to the State, but because the State’s own actions [in 
administering the forum], and their relationship to the private speech at issue, 
actually convey a message of endorsement. 
Id. at 777 (internal citations omitted).  Thus, in such situations, Justice O’Connor apparently believes 
the state is acting to send a message separate from the message of the private speaker, a message that 
endorses what the private speaker is saying.  On this understanding, violation of the Establishment 
Clause still comes from government speech—in this case, the governmental message of endorsement 
sent by the government’s actions in administering the forum.  Without necessarily endorsing Justice 
O’Connor’s view of how endorsement is to be identified in public forums, I think in the end she is 
saying what I am saying: messages that violate the Establishment Clause constitute government speech. 
383 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587–89 (1992). 
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display in its courthouse, consisting of a framed copy of the Ten 
Commandments and eight other framed historical documents of equal 
size,384 it is relatively easy to characterize the display as government 
speech under factor one and factor two as well, whether or not the elements 
of the display were donated to the county.385 
Less clear, perhaps, was the nature of a student-led prayer at a public 
school football game.  In that case, however, the Court emphasized the 
unique history of the school’s policies governing such messages.  For 
many years this public high school had scheduled student-led public 
prayers at home football games, and only later—after litigation—adopted a 
policy to allow students to vote on whether to have a popularly-elected 
student deliver “a brief invocation and/or message” to begin the games.386  
The school also promulgated content rules applying to any message thus 
delivered.387  A student was elected under this policy and delivered prayers 
at the games.388  Under these circumstances, the Court found that the 
“prayers bear ‘the imprint of the State’”389 and did not constitute private 
speech.390  The outcome would likely be the same under factor one of the 
three-factor test: the history at this school indicated that the government 
independently came up with the idea of reaching an audience with prayers 
over the loudspeaker at home football games, and the latest policy was not 
an effort to create a forum for private speakers, but merely the 
government’s attempt to assure that the prayers continued.391 
B.  Future Applications—Specialty License Plates 
A uniform method of identifying government speech would prove 
especially useful in one set of cases that has recently divided the federal 
courts of appeals: the cases involving specialty license plate programs.392  
These programs have already been discussed to some extent,393 but it might 
be useful to apply the three-factor test to them more directly and suggest 
the proper legal resolution of these cases. 
License plates vary, as do the state programs established to regulate 
them.  The proper answer to the government speech question will likely 
                                                                                                                          
384 See McCreary County v. ACLU,  545 U.S. 844, 851–56 (1992). 
385 See supra notes 302–19 and accompanying text for a discussion of governmental monuments 
and displays and the application of the three-factor test to them. 
386 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 295–98 & n.6. 
387 Id. at 298 n.6. 
388 Id. at 298. 
389 Id. at 305 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992)). 
390 Id. at 310. 
391 See id. at 306–07, 309–11, 315 (reaching similar conclusions after analyzing history and 
context of policy). 
392 See supra note 9. 
393 See supra notes 9–17 and accompanying text; notes 72–114 and accompanying text; notes 
133–41 and accompanying text; notes 152–85 and accompanying text. 
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depend on the type of license plate, or even the type of specialty plate 
program, at issue.  With regard to any particular program or type of plate, 
we will want to know whether it involves one of the three types of 
government speech thus far recognized by the Supreme Court. 
As to standard-issue plates, it is difficult to view the messages 
contained there as anything but government speech.  Motorists do not 
choose to display those messages, since presumably the law requires that 
they must; moreover, the government crafted the message and also came 
up with the idea of putting it on standard-issue plates.  If a private motorist 
disagrees with the message, the state has to allow him not to display it—
this is the teaching of Wooley v. Maynard394—but the Court did not reach 
this result because the message “Live Free or Die” included some 
component of private speech; rather, the Court held that private speech 
rights are violated when the government compels a private motorist 
personally to convey the government’s own message.395  The messages 
contained in the alphanumeric combinations on vanity plates, by contrast, 
ought to be regarded as private speech.  Although the government owns the 
license plate and the government’s name is embossed on it, no one—
including the government—views the alphanumeric combinations (or all 
elements of all license plates, for that matter) as a medium or format 
clearly reserved for the government’s own messages.  And of course the 
government did not come up with the idea of putting any of the particular 
chosen messages on a license plate. 
Specialty plates are the most difficult case of all, but calling them 
hybrid speech merely hides the ball.  It would be more accurate, perhaps, 
to say that specialty plates (like vanity plates) contain some government 
speech and some private speech on each plate.  The elements of 
government speech would include the state name, any state motto or other 
design that the state has required for all license plates, and the overall 
dimensions, materials, and construction of the plate (to the extent these 
elements could be deemed expressive).  These are elements which are 
present only because the government came up with the idea of making 
license plates in this way with these messages.  It might also be that 
messages honoring or identifying a particular group selected by the state—
say, Purple Heart recipients or firefighters396—could be considered 
                                                                                                                          
394 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977). 
395 See id. at 715 (“New Hampshire’s statute in effect requires that appellees use their private 
property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message—or suffer a penalty.” (emphasis 
added)). 
396 Tennessee, for example, offers both these plate designs.  The state groups its specialty plates 
into categories, including “Clubs/Groups,” “Collegiate Plates,” “Disabled Plates,” “Emergency 
Management,” and “Military/Veterans.”  See Tennessee Department of Revenue, Specialty License 
Plates, http://tennessee.gov/revenue/vehicle/licenseplates/specialty.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2009).  
The Purple Heart plate is classified within the “Military/Veterans” category and is available only to 
Tennessee residents who can prove that they have been awarded the Purple Heart; there is no charge to 
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government speech, assuming that these groups did not petition the 
government for issuance of the plates and the government was not trying to 
give these groups a way to raise money and public awareness for some 
cause.397  But when a particular organization’s logo or design appears on a 
plate only because the organization came up with the idea of trying to 
qualify for the issuance of a specialty plate bearing that design, the design 
is not properly viewed as government speech; those logos and designs are 
private speech.  For one thing, the government did not independently come 
up with the idea of putting that particular message on a specialty plate, or 
even with some “overall message” to be conveyed by its specialty plate 
program.  For another, assuming the program allows or encourages private 
applications of some sort (whether through legislative lobbying or through 
paperwork filed with a state bureaucratic office), the medium or format of 
specialty plate designs are not clearly reserved for government messages; 
instead, they are open to multiple private speakers for the purpose of 
raising revenue for the state and the organization and, to a lesser extent, for 
encouraging the speech of private organizations and motorists.  Finally, it 
is clear that the literal speaker, whoever that may be, is not a government 
employee whose job it is to send messages on license plates concerning 
subjects like adoption or NASCAR. 
These sorts of specialty plate programs are not reasonably viewed as 
the state’s bully pulpit for sending its own messages, but rather as a state-
regulated forum for the expression of a variety of private messages.  The 
fact that any such messages must be approved in advance by the state 
suggests, not government speech, but the possibility of improper viewpoint 
discrimination among private speakers.  Using such evidence to show 
either government speech or a governmental component of hybrid speech 
is to use evidence of viewpoint discrimination as a justification for 
                                                                                                                          
the motorist for this plate.  See Tennessee Department of Revenue, Specialty License Plates—
Military/Veterans: Purple Heart, http://tennessee.gov/revenue/vehicle/licenseplates/militaryveterans/ 
militarydesc.htm#purpleheart (last visited Aug. 31, 2009).  The Firefighter plate is classified within the 
“Emergency Management” category and is available only to Tennessee residents who can prove that 
they are current or retired members of a “bona fide” “firefighting unit.”  The charge for this plate is 
$21.50, which is the same as the charge for a standard plate.  See Tennessee Department of Revenue, 
Specialty License Plates—Emergency Management: Firefighter, http://tennessee.gov/revenue/vehicle/ 
licenseplates/emergency/emergdesc.htm#firefighter (last visited Aug. 31, 2009).  The standard plate is 
listed as “Automobile/Motor Home” within the “Miscellaneous” category.  See Tennessee Department 
of Revenue, Specialty License Plates—Miscellaneous, http://tennessee.gov/revenue/vehicle/ 
licenseplates/misc/miscdesc.htm#automobile (last visited Aug. 31, 2009). 
397 To the extent a qualified private motorist chooses such a plate instead of a standard-issue plate, 
the message “I am a Purple Heart recipient” or “I am a firefighter” would also be the private speech of 
the motorist.  This might be the closest thing to true “hybrid speech.”  But that should not affect the 
analysis.  The fact that the government’s predetermined message happens to be endorsed by a private 
speaker should not mean that the government is speaking any less or that it is less free to specify which 
of these sorts of messages it will issue in this way.  Nor should any of this affect our analysis under the 
Establishment Clause; the private speaker has a First Amendment right to endorse religion, but no First 
Amendment right to demand that the government endorse religion first, thereby allowing her to join in. 
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viewpoint discrimination. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
First Amendment principles require judges to differentiate between the 
messages of the government and those of private parties.  Messages 
endorsing religion cannot violate the Establishment Clause unless the 
government crafts or adopts the message as its own.  And governmental 
restrictions on a message’s viewpoint cannot violate the Speech Clause 
unless the message is someone else’s.  The distinction between 
government speech and private speech makes sense because we want to 
allow the government to send its own messages as a participant in the 
marketplace of ideas, but we do not want to allow the government to 
allocate its vast resources discriminatorily so as to hobble whatever private 
viewpoints it disfavors.  If this distinction between government and private 
speech makes sense, then it should be recognized—even in the hard cases 
in the middle. 
Thus far, the Supreme Court has recognized the distinction but has 
given only limited guidance about how to identify government speech in 
questionable cases.  Still, what the Court has said can be largely distilled to 
three factors that independently indicate the presence of government 
speech.  Compared to the single-prong, four-pronged, and mixed speech 
approaches developed over the past decade by federal judges and 
commentators, these three factors seem not only somewhat less subjective, 
but also more closely tied to the essence of government speech.  In short, 
the presence of any one of these three factors tends to show that the 
government has developed or adopted, in the words of the Court, a 
“programmatic message of the kind recognized in Rust . . . .”398  
Governments that do this are indeed sending their own messages. 
                                                                                                                          
398 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001). 
